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Abstract 
 
 
 
GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES FOR TECHNOLOGICAL LEARNING IN KOREA: 
How Korea could build an interrelation between government and market 
 
By 
 
Jang Saeng KIM 
 
 
Technological progress is a key determinant of economic growth. As many scholars pointed 
out, it is one of the key measures that can analyze and explain success or failure of a 
country’s economic development. This study addresses three issues as such: 1) what 
government incentives have been initiated, 2) how market (firms) has responded to 
government incentives, 3) what interactive framework between the two has played to achieve 
technological learning from 1960s to 1990s. 
  
The study defines a framework of government incentives for technological learning on the 
basis of outward-looking development strategy as follows: 1) industrial policy as a demand of 
technology, 2) science and technology policy as a supply of technology. Tax exemptions and 
financial support are practical examples of incentives to stimulate economic units. For the 
market responses to the government incentives, the study introduces firms’ continuous 
innovation for serving best goods and services with low cost to satisfy customers. The 
framework covers the following items based on firms’ devotion for acquiring knowledge and 
intensity of efforts: 1) technology transfer and diffusion, 2) in-house R&D, 3) human capital, 
and 4) crisis management and organizational restructuring within firm. 
 
As a conclusion, this study provides following implications for catching-up countries based 
on Korea’s experience; 1) applied technology development policy tends to foster faster 
economic growth than that of basic scientific research oriented policy in the early stage of 
industrialization (the role of KIST and its spin-offs), 2) interactive linkage between 
government and market is essential (a case of semiconductor and CDMA industrial 
consortiums), 3) government incentive with high pressure to stimulate market should be 
sustainable in the early stage of development (monthly export promotion meeting as a 
platform of trouble shooting). In addition, the study points out common elements to develop 
technology as such: government leadership, appropriate strategy and commitment, well-
trained manpower, effective technology supporting systems, attractive incentive mechanism, 
and intensifying efforts of business anchors. 
 
Keywords: Government policy/intervention/incentives, Technological progress/learning/ 
capability, Market response, Interactive/Interplay, Intensity of efforts, Crisis environment 
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1. Introduction 
 
 There has been a long controversy as to why some nations are richer and grow much 
faster than those that are still poor and grow much slower. The most noticeable recent 
examples are Japan and Four Asian Tigers: Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong. 
Especially, Korea has transformed itself from one of the poorest countries in the world in 
19621 with no natural resources to one of dynamic advanced countries with highly advanced 
manufacturing industry nowadays2. Its annual GDP growth rate had maintained about 9 
percent for three decades from 1960s3.  
 In order to understand and explore these interesting stories, many scholars and 
economists of development economics have put in diverse efforts. Robert Solow (1956), the 
Nobel Prize winner in economics, developed a growth model with two main factors, capital 
and labor, and one dependent factor, technological progress, to the capital or labor. However, 
his model had limited explanatory power of the whole nature of economic growth. New 
growth theories, in order to supplement and contradict the Solow’s limitation, assume that a 
country’s economic and technological level of development is closely related and is 
positively correlated. Especially they emphasized the technology should be regarded as 
endogenous instead of as a free good and endogenous. Technology gap approach developed 
by new growth theorists defines that the technology levels and economic and social structures 
are main factors to achieve high economic growth in addition to capital and labor4. 
 Reviewing those economic histories, this study has raised a question on how to 
acquire and upgrade technology and what incentives have been interplayed to do so. 
                                           
1 GNI per capita of Korea was only 87 US Dollar (World Bank) 
2 Korea joined the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1996 and GNI per 
capita of Korea reached 27,839 US Dollar in 2008 (OECD) 
3 Korea GDP growth rate was 8.6% in 1960s, 9.5% in 1970s and 9.6% in 1980s (Jaspersen 1997) 
4 Those arguments will be reviewed and discussed in the literature review in chapter 2 
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Especially like many other developing countries, the Korean government initiated diverse 
policy tools for technological progress in order to achieve economic development. Also, 
technological change in developing countries is a process of technological upgrade through 
acquiring and improving existing technologies in the global market rather than a process of 
innovating and creating new technology. Therefore, this study premises that a critical 
determinant of economic development is different rates of technological learning by different 
countries because all countries have access to the same international array of technical 
knowledge and equipment. And this is a key to explain what made Korea different from other 
developing countries. 
 Probably, there are several influencing factors explaining the phenomenon such as 
stock of wealth, standard of living, and sociocultural difference. However the focus of this 
study limits technological learning of Korea in the early stage of industrialization from 1960s 
to 1990s (until 1997 when Asia financial crisis attacked to Korea, in particular). This study 
argues into 3 parts on the basis of findings from Lall (1992, 2001, 2003), Kim (1990, 1997), 
and Suh et al (2007) as such: first, what government incentives have been initiated; second, 
how market (and individual enterprises) has responded to the government incentives; third, 
what interactive framework between two has played to achieve sustainable technological 
learning. This study premises that interaction among stakeholders such as government, 
market and individual firm is the most powerful mechanism for achieving technological 
learning and progress, which are the sustainable growth engines toward advancing into an 
industrialized country. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
 What factors determine economic growth? There has been a long controversy among 
development economists as to the factors of economic growth. Capital, labor, (endogenous or 
exogenous) technology, social capabilities and etc. were pointed out as key determinant 
factors by many scholars. Among those, technology itself has been into severe debate in 
terms of its characteristics. However, it is undeniable that technological progress is a key 
determinant of economic growth which can explain why economic growth rate differ and 
why resource poor countries could develop faster than resource rich countries. 
In this chapter, we will review the theoretical arguments from neoclassic school (or 
mainstream economics) to new theorist (or revisionists and institutionists) regarding 
determinant factors of economic growth. In addition, this chapter reviews technology as a key 
finding measure of explaining economic growth and growth dynamics and analyzes how to 
enhance technological capabilities. Table 2-1summarizes different perspectives between 
traditional school and new theory in terms of technology as a major determinant of economic 
growth. 
 
 
2.1. Background Information of Theoretical Arguments for Economic Growth 
 
 The neoclassic economists have been discussing and analyzing ceaselessly what 
factors have contributed to economic growth. However, they mainly focused on the 
relationship among income distribution, capital and labor accumulation, and growth, rather 
than technology.  
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2.1.1. Solow Model 
 
In 1956, through his paper “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth”, 
Robert Solow proposed a neoclassical growth model to explain the production function of an 
economy. In the model, he introduced the concept of technological progress as the variable of 
the production function in addition to capital and labor variable, which can be written as 
follows: 
 
Y = Kα(AL)α 
 
In the model, A is the technology variable. K and L are capital and labor variables, 
respectively. According to Solow, technology is a public good that everyone could access and 
use for free of charge. Solow assumed that the technological progress is exogenous, which is 
not affected by the actions of the firms and capital accumulation path is consistent with any 
growth rate of the labor force in addition to constant return of scale of capital and labor. 
Under these assumptions, the Solow model suggests that sustainable economic growth is 
possible only with technological progress. In fact, in 1957, using his model, Solow calculated 
that technological change accounted for seventh-eighths of US growth per worker over the 
first half of the twentieth century. He further concluded that in the long run, technological 
change drives long-run growth, not investment, which contrasts with the traditional view that 
investment was the dominant driver of long-run growth. 
Solow also projected that due to technological borrowing, the poor countries could 
catch up developed countries. He argued that the marginal product of capital was higher in 
countries of low income with low level of capital than in countries of high income with high 
level of capital. His idea implies that capital should naturally flow from rich and developed 
5 
 
countries to poor and developing countries and the poor countries would have higher growth 
rates than developed countries. In other words, all countries’ growth rates will converge to a 
certain level and form a common steady state. 
In contrast to the US case, the model does not fully explain the failure of growth in 
poor countries. For example, Paul Romer (1988) showed that the Solow model fails to 
explain the growth of poor countries. Using data on over a hundred countries complied by 
Robert Summers and Alan Heston (1978), Romer demonstrated that for the period 1960-1999, 
the poorest countries did significantly worse than the rich countries; only two-fifth of the 
poorest countries recorded positive growth, which was contrast to Solow’s argument.  
 In 1962, Nicholas Kaldor, James Mirrlees, and Kenneth Arrow pointed out the 
limitation of Solow’s assumption for technological progress as an endogenized factor instead 
of neutral and exdogenized one in the name of vintage model of economic growth. They 
claimed technology can be embodied in learning by doing together with capital goods. In the 
vintage model, technological progress is interpreted as an externality, i.e., an unintended side-
effect of other economic activities (investment) (Fagerberg, 1994). 
 
 
2.1.2. Solow Residual, Total Factor Productivity and Growth Accounting 
 
The Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is a measure of the physical output produced 
from an economy that is not caused by inputs such as labor and capital. TFP can be 
considered as a measure of a country’s technological change if the inputs are not accounted 
for the output. In cases, TFP may also reflect omitted inputs. TFP cannot be measured as the 
omitted inputs directly. Instead, a residual, often called the Solow residual, takes place in 
explaining remaining output not caused by inputs. The Solow residual works on the principle 
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that greater productivity of labor will affect the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of a country’s 
economy, along with concrete factors like capital allocation and available amount of labor. 
Some aspects of total factor productivity and the use of the Solow residual are in question 
among the community of economists due to possible inaccuracy of certain variables.  
Technological growth and efficiency are regarded as two of the biggest sub-sections 
of total factor productivity, the former possessing special inherent features such as positive 
externalities and non-rivalness which enhance its position as a driver of economic growth. 
TFP is often seen as the real driver of growth within an economy and studies reveal that labor 
and investment are important contributors5. TFP suggests that capital accumulation and labor 
growth do not fully account for economic growth and technological progress is the ultimate 
source of economic growth. TFP cannot simultaneously measure all technological change, 
but just the free gifts from externalities and scale effects. 
Griliches (1972) pointed out some conceptual and empirical problems regarding the 
measurement of TFP. The problems include a relevant concept of capital, measurement of 
output, measurement of inputs, the place of R&D and public infrastructure, missing or 
inappropriate data, weights for indices, theoretical specifications of relations between inputs, 
technology and aggregate production functions, and aggregation over heterogeneity.  
It is well known that much technological change is concentrated in the industries 
producing capital goods. An excellent case study of such changes is found in Rosenberg’s 
analysis of the US machine tool industry in the 19th and early 20th century. The development 
of cost-cutting, output-increasing tools of standardized production was one of the major 
reasons why the US began to overhaul Europe in economic growth and technological 
dynamism (Rosenberg 1976, 1994). 
                                           
5 TFP accounted for 51% of growth in U.S. economy from 1948 to 1979 (Denision, 1985) 
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As an effort to determine what proportions of recorded economic growth could be 
attributed to growth in capital stock, growth in the labor force, and changes in overall 
efficiency, Robert Solow developed a procedure, “growth accounting” or “sources of growth 
analysis”, to focus directly on the contribution of each term in the production function.  
 Using the formula Y=F(K, L, A) where Y is output, K is capital, L is labor, and A is a 
parameter to capture the effects that are independent from capital stock and labor supply 
which might influence growth (increasing technology, worker skill levels, education, health, 
institutions, etc.). In this case, “A” is generally referred to total factor productivity. Since A 
captures not only efficiency gains but also the net effect of errors and omissions from 
economic data, the residual A is sometimes referred to as a measure of ignorance about the 
growth process.    
 
8 
 
Table 2-1  Different Approaches on Technology between Traditional and New Growth Theory 
Mainstream Growth Theory New Growth Theory 
Nature of Technology 
Technology is codified information that can be transmitted fully between 
firms 
Information on sources and characteristics of all technologies available to 
all firms 
Technology is an ‘artifact’, knowledge and skills 
Technology is not fully codifiable, has important tacit elements 
Use of technology requires development of capabilities, both technical and 
organizational 
Using, diffusing and creating technology 
Selection of ‘appropriate’ technology consists of optimizing on a known 
production function 
Access to technology is costless 
There is no learning process, or, if there is, learning is automatic and 
predictable (along a known learning curve) 
Non-market links and interactions between firms are irrelevant 
There are no important externalities in the learning process 
Using a new technology is completely different from ‘innovation’ (move 
along versus shift of the production function) 
 
 
There are no cumulative processes or path dependence in technology 
development 
Firms maximize an objective function with full knowledge of alternatives  
In an ‘efficient’ system there will only be one technology that is 
economically feasible and all firms will use it equally well. Any 
deviations from this are due to uncompetitive markets or government 
intervention in free markets 
Firms are not on a fully known production function but on a ‘point’ with 
increasing information fuzziness’ away from that point 
Search for technology can be costly 
Firms have different capabilities for accessing technology 
Absorption of technology can be costly and prolonged (this may not be 
fully understood by firms), needing conscious effort 
Technological development is a learning process; and learning to use 
technology is not always different from improving upon or creating tech. 
Learning is not automatic or predictable and may itself have to be learnt 
(learning to learn) 
Co-evolution of technology, industry and institutions 
 
Learning is collective, cumulative and path-dependent 
Efficient technology development needs corresponding development in 
factor markets (especially skills, technology and finance) 
Firms do not maximize objective function but develop satisficing routines 
which are difficult to change. Adoption of innovation routines should be 
considered learning and diffusion process 
Learning relies heavily on interfirm interactions, vertical and horizontal; 
involves both technology and organizational routines 
Technologies differ by firm and there is wide variation in efficiency and 
mastery 
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Specificity, variety and modes of transfer 
At firm level, no specificity or variety within technologies 
 
Inter-sectoral differences rarely considered 
 
At the country level, only differences in technology arise from different 
choices of technique reflecting different factor price ratios 
 
Best way to develop technologically is to have free trade, free flow of 
investment and appropriate educational policies 
 
In equilibrium, there is no difference between different modes of technology 
transfer. Free markets yield best set of choices 
Many idiosyncratic features of technology and technological learning at 
firm level 
High levels of specificity of each innovation and technological ‘trajectory’. 
Large number of variants of particular technologies 
At the country level, there are strong differences based on level of 
technological capability, skills and institutional structures, effectiveness of 
absorption and cost of learning processes 
Development of appropriate set of technologies and technological 
capabilities may require both trade and investment interventions and 
technology (and other) policies 
Mode of technology transfer matters: externalized modes (licensing or 
capital goods) may be more conducive to technological deepening than 
internalized modes (FDI) where innovative functions remain abroad 
Externalities 
Externalities arise only from imperfect appropriability of information and 
vertical technological linkages 
Externalities are limited and sporadic 
Externalities are difficult or impossible to identify 
 
 
Externalities are not technology specific, so should be dealt with by non-
selective measures 
Externalities are strong and pervasive 
 
Externalities are embedded in collective learning processes 
Externalities are not only technological: they also arise in connection with 
managerial and organizational learning and from marketing. Some of 
these effects horizontally straddle sectors and even technologies 
Many important externalities are technology and cluster specific 
 
Some technologies and clusters yield more dynamic growth and spillovers 
than others 
Externalities are not very difficult to identify although they should not be 
defined with reference to static equilibria 
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Risk and uncertainty 
Low levels of risk and uncertainty in absorbing and using existing 
technologies 
Innovation involves risk, which is adequately represented by an ‘innovation 
possibility frontier’ 
Liberalization does not create additional risk 
High degree of uncertainty in absorbing technologies by industrial 
‘latecomers’ 
Risk and uncertainty in predicting economic impacts of learning, especially 
in context of liberalization 
Source: Lall, 2001 
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2.2. Importance of Technology for Economic Growth 
 
 Even though scholars from different schools have been discussing about different 
characteristics of technology for decades, they all agree that technology is a key factor for 
economic development. Table 2-2 shows a summary of diverse researches regarding the 
importance of technology for economic growth. 
 
Table 2-2  Summary of Studies related to the Importance of Technology for Economic Growth 
Year Author Title Argument to technological progress 
1956 Solow “A contribution to the theory of economic growth” Technological change drives long-run growth. 
1962 Gerschenkron Economic backwardness in historical perspective 
“The early literature was especially concerned 
with the distinction between countries on-and 
behind-the technological frontier.” 
1962 Kaldor et al. “A New Model of Economic Growth” 
This research criticizes the Solow’s 
assumption of technological progress as an 
exdogenized factor and redefined it as an 
endogenized one. 
1962 Arrow “The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing” 
“No economist would ever have denied the 
role of technological change in economic 
growth.” 
1963 Ames et al. 
“Changing Technological 
Leadership and industrial 
growth” 
Technological differences are the prime cause 
for differences in GDP per capita across 
countries. 
1973 Ōkawa et al. 
Japanese economic growth: 
trend acceleration in the 
twentieth century 
Social capability as one of main contributor 
for economic growth is regarded as a country’s 
ability to engage in technological and 
organizational progress. 
1976 Cornwall “Diffusion, Convergence and Kaldor's Laws” 
The growth rate of manufacturing output 
originates from the international diffusion 
process of technology. 
1977 Chandler 
The visible hand: The 
managerial revolution in 
American business 
Firms with intrinsic capabilities based on 
technological know-now and strategies are one 
of key players for economic growth. 
1982 Nelson et al. An evolutionary theory of economic change 
Technical advance influences market structure 
and it causes economic growth in broad sense. 
1986 Abramovitz “Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind” 
Technical competence is one of important 
elements of social capability. 
1987 Fagerberg “A technology gap approach to why growth rates differ” 
Close correlation between the level of 
economic development and that of 
technological development is existed. 
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Year Author Title Argument to technological progress 
1987 Fagerberg “A technology gap approach to why growth rates differ” 
Close correlation between the level of 
economic development and that of 
technological development is existed. 
1991 Romer “Endogenous Technological Change” 
Technological change drives economic growth 
and technology is neither a conventional nor a 
public good but instead is a non-rival, 
excludable good. 
1991 Grossman et al. 
Innovation and Growth in the 
Global Economy 
The technical change through continuous 
investment has played a major role in the 
growth process. 
1992 Wright et al. 
“The rise and fall of American 
technological leadership: the 
postwar era in historical 
perspective” 
Technology embedded in organizational 
structures would be crucial in the process of 
economic growth. 
1994 Krugman “The Myth of Asia’s Miracle” Technological advances have led to a continual increase in total factor productivity. 
1994 Fagerberg “Technology and International Differences in Growth Rates” 
Different growth rates among countries are 
related to the level of technology. 
1995 David et al. 
“Accessing and expanding the 
science and technology 
knowledge base” 
Innovation capability based on technological 
enhancement and diffusion is a key component 
to give a direct influence on economic 
performance. 
1997 Kim Imitation to Innovation 
“Technological change has been a major 
determinant of national economic 
development.” 
1997 OECD National Innovation System 
Technological development is as important as 
investments in research and development and 
is a key to explain different economic growth 
rate. 
2001 Lall Competitiveness, Technology and Skills 
Market-stimulating technology policy by 
NICs’ government was one of key success 
factor for their rapid national growth. 
2003 Lall et al. 
Competitiveness, FDI and 
Technological Activity in East 
Asia 
Technological activity and FDI inflows have 
contributed to export competitiveness and 
economic growth in East Asia 
2007 Suh et al. Korea as a Knowledge Economy 
Korea’s rapid industrialization is fueled by the 
government’s strong commitment to 
technology-based national development. 
2009 Lee et al. 
“Both Institutions and Policies 
Matter but Differently for 
Different Income Groups of 
Countries: Determinants of 
Long-Run Economic Growth 
Revisited” 
At the country level, technological capabilities 
one of the most important determinants of 
long-run economic growth is more important 
than openness or integration. 
Source: Author’s compilation 
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2. 3. New Growth Theory and Technology Gap 
 
In an effort to explore additional factors of economic growth, a new theory was 
developed in the 1980s. In his paper, Romer (1990, 1991) stated that technological change 1) 
is an economic good and is the driving force of economic growth, 2) arises due to people 
responding to market incentives, and 3) is inherently different from other economic goods. 
Romer stated that technology is a good that was neither a conventional nor a public good but 
instead is a non-rival, partially excludable good. This was an important distinction in that 
private goods are seen as provided by markets and public goods either occur naturally or are 
provided by governments to compensate for market failure. 
The distinction between rival and non-rival goods and the degree to which their use 
can be excluded from others is the key premise of Romer’s model. A rival good is one that 
can be possessed by only one person at a time. The access that a person or a firm has to a 
rival or non-rival product is termed as excludability. Technology is considered as a non-rival 
input that is at least partially excludable otherwise there would not be an economic incentive 
to develop it in case where there is no way to at least partially limit free access. Human 
capital, on the other hand, is a rival good that is excludable.  
Support to generate new technology is seen as a non-rival and partially excludable 
good which is a requirement for production. Imperfect markets require government support 
for innovation and technology. The neoclassical growth model, on the other hand, assumes 
perfect competition and argues that the market makes the best allocation of resources 
including investments in technology (actually technology is exogenous, not accounted for 
within the neoclassical model). The debate between public and private goods is important.  
Depending upon the theoretical approach, public support for innovation and improved 
business processes, activities at the heart of a value chain approach, can be justified.   
14 
 
In order to find an answer for different growth rate by new growth theorists, the 
technology gap model has been developed. Studies show that differences in growth rates 
among countries are only partially explained by growth of capital and labor. To explain the 
differences in growth rates, researchers including Posner (1961), Gomulka (1971), and 
Cornwall (1976 and 1982) developed the technology gap approach. According to this 
approach, the international economic system is characterized by marked differences in 
technological levels and trends and the differences can only be overcome through radical 
changes in technological, economic and social structures.  
The technology gap approach assumes that a country’s economic and technological 
level of development is closely related. More specifically, economic growth of a country is 
positively correlated with growth in the technology level of the country. The approach also 
assumes that a country with a lower technology level than the technologically advanced 
countries can increase its rate of economic growth though imitation efforts. The technology 
gap theorists claim that the country that introduces new goods in a market experiences an 
advantage. More specifically, the country that produces innovative goods enjoys a monopoly 
and a profit until other countries produce the goods. 
According to neoclassical theory, the level of technological development of a country 
depends primarily on capital and labor. On the other hand, the technology gap theorists relate 
a country’s technological level with its level of innovative activity. A high level of innovative 
activity is associated with a high level of new goods in output and new techniques used in 
production. Since new goods entails high prices and new techniques lead to high productivity, 
countries with high level of innovative activities are more likely to have high level of value-
added per worker, or GDP per capita. 
As part of the technology gap approach, Fagerberg (1987) suggests that measures of 
technological level and innovative activity may be divided into “technology input” measures 
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and “technology output” measures. More specifically, a country’s technology level can be 
measured by expenditures on education, R&D, and employment of scientists and engineers 
and innovative activities can be measured by patenting activity such as number of patents.  
 Like other approaches, the technology gap approach has problems. First of all, as the 
measurement of technological level, R&D is found to be unreliable due to poor quality of the 
related data, especially those earlier than 1970 and for non-OECD countries. In addition, the 
technology gap models are found to be less effective in explaining the differences in growth 
among developed countries, especially the small and medium-sized countries since most of 
them have similar levels of development. 
 
 
2.4. National Innovation System 
 
 Criticism to mainstream of growth theory that considered technological change as a 
view of relation between inputs and outputs has created a new concept called national 
innovation systems (NIS) since late 1980s. Freeman (1987), Lundvall (1992), Nelson (1993), 
and etc. are the creators and contributors to the NIS approach.  
 A national innovation system can be interpreted as a series of process that consists of 
interactive sub-activities among various organizations and institutions in order to attain 
innovation and economic growth. The interactions among the players involved in technology 
development are as important as (or may more important than) investments in R&D activities. 
According to OECD (1997), even though there is no single definition of the NIS, OECD 
refers that the concept of national innovation systems rests on the premise that understanding 
the linkages among the actors involved in innovation is the key to improving technology 
performance. Innovation and technical progress are the results of a complex set of 
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relationships among actors producing, distributing and applying various kinds of knowledge. 
Balzat and Hanusch (2004) describe the NIS to be a historically grown subsystem of the 
national economy, in which various organizations and institutions interact with each other in 
carrying out innovative capacity. The OECD paper also introduces other definitions that 
created by other influential scholars given in Box 1. 
 
 
Box 1 
National innovation systems: definitions 
A national system of innovation has been defined as follows: 
l “.. the network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose 
activities and interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new 
technologies.” (Freeman, 1987) 
 
l “.. the elements and relationships which interact in the production, 
diffusion and use of new, and economically useful, knowledge ... and 
are either located within or rooted inside the borders of a nation 
state.” (Lundvall, 1992) 
 
l “... a set of institutions whose interactions determine the innovative 
performance ... of national firms.” (Nelson, 1993) 
 
l “.. the national institutions, their incentive structures and their 
competencies, that determine the rate and direction of technological 
learning (or the volume and composition of change generating 
activities) in a country.” (Patel and Pavitt, 1994) 
 
l “.. that set of distinct institutions which jointly and individually 
contribute to the development and diffusion of new technologies and 
which provides the framework within which governments form and 
implement policies to influence the innovation process. As such it is a 
system of interconnected institutions to create, store and transfer the 
knowledge, skills and artefacts which define new technologies.” 
(Metcalfe, 1995) 
 
Source: OECD (1997) 
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 In short, the NIS can be considered as a systemic approach to innovation in the 
process of interaction between relevant players. There are several ingredients for the NIS: 1) 
Education system as an aim for producing talented and high skilled people who will 
contribute to knowledge transfer and diffusion activities, 2) science and technology capability 
that can be a main resource for R&D activities, 3) industrial structure and targeting that will 
be a key determinant factor for national competitiveness. In addition, Porter (2001) 
mentioned the importance of demand as a new element because the demand (both the level of 
demand and the type of demand) plays a critical role in pulling innovation processes. 
 The NIS studies give a big influence to policymakers. In case of national roadmap of 
R&D expenditure, the idea that allocating more R&D budget would automatically lead to 
better innovation was replaced by the idea that better coordination of R&D money would 
contribute to more innovation because innovation is the result of a complex interaction 
between different elements of a system. Since the late 1990s the NIS system became a 
dominant tool for many comparative studies in OECD and European countries. 
 However, NIS has limitations: 1) lack of substance and statistics, 2) focus on national 
aspects, 3) too broad approach, and 4) difficulty to conduct effective transnational 
comparisons. 
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3. Analytical Framework 
 
3.1. Technological Progress 
 
Technological change has become a major determinant of economic growth. In 
industrialized countries, many studies have found that more than 50 percent of long-term 
economic development is caused by technological changes that improve productivity and 
lead to new products, processes, or industries6. For this reason, the question often raised is 
how technology, a key of industrial development in advanced countries, can be effectively 
used for economic and social development in developing nations. 
In order to discuss about technology and technological activities, let us have common 
understandings on the definitions. Technology can be defined as an aggregation of practical 
processes that transforms inputs to outputs on the basis of accumulated knowledge, skills, 
know-how, and know-why that contribute to the process formulation. Kim (1997) stated it 
clearly and concisely as follows: 
 
“Technology is the physical application of knowledge, skills and others to the 
establishment, operation, improvement, and expansion of facilities for such transformation 
and to the designing and improving of outputs therefrom.” 
 
The term technological capability refers to the complex of capability such as skills, 
experience and effort that enables a country’s economic agents like enterprises to efficiently 
buy, acquire, use, adapt, assimilate, improve and create technologies in order to develop new 
                                           
6 See the references: Imitation to Innovation (Kim, 1997), Why Growth Rates Differ (Denison et al., 1967), 
Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy (Grossman at al., 1991) and “Technological Innovation and the 
Economy” (Goldsmith, 1970) 
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products and processes in response to changing economic environment. And technological 
learning is used to depict the dynamic process of acquiring technological capability. The 
technological learning takes place at two different levels: individual and organizational. The 
prime actors in the process of organizational learning are the individuals within a firm. 
Organizational learning is not, however, a simple sum of individual learning; rather, it is 
dynamic and complex combination of knowledge which is acquired, assimilated, generated 
and distributed across the organization and is integrated into the strategy and management of 
the organization. Only effective and systematic organizations can translate and accumulate 
individual learning into organizational learning. 
 In this part, we will argue the efforts and interaction of two major stakeholders, 
government and market (including firms), under the regime of incentives. That is, how 
government creates or manipulates environment through intervention with appropriate 
incentives in order to improve national technological capability and how market has 
responded to the government incentives in order to upgrade its own technological capability. 
In addition, details on the kinds of implemented incentives would be explained. 
 
3.1.1. Different Processes of Technological Progress 
 
In order to explain the process of technological progress in developing countries, 
Kim (1997) created the model of technological progress in catching-up countries. In addition, 
he incorporated this model into the technological trajectory model by Utterback (1994) and 
Lee et al. (1988). Figure 3-1 illustrates a map of technological progress in two trajectories: 
one in advanced countries and the other in catching-up countries. The technological 
trajectories refer to the evolutionary process for enhancing technological capability across 
industries and sectors.  
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Technological Trajectory in Advanced Countries 
 
Utterback (1994) devised the technological trajectory model in advanced countries, 
which can be explained by three stages: fluid, transition and specific. Despite the fact that this 
model is too simplified to fully explain the nature of technological change in different 
countries and industries, at least it provides a comprehensive overview of technological 
capabilities in those countries. The upper part of figure 3-1 shows the above three stages.  
First, firms own a new technology exhibit a fluid pattern in innovation. The new 
product with state-of-art technology is often turned out to be crude, expensive, and unreliable, 
but it fits into some market needs. At this stage, technical entrepreneurs initiate new venture 
firms, concentrate their efforts to enhance their capability in product innovation in a way to 
prepare themselves for competition in the market. High failure risk, massive trial and error 
and frequent product changes happen frequently. Therefore, the production system remains to 
be fluid and the organization maintains its flexibility for quick and appropriate response on 
the changes in market and technology. 
Second stage is transition. As market need for products becomes more formulated 
and specified, a transition period begins. Mass-production system has been introduced to 
achieve competitive product price with good quality. Cost competition leads to radical change 
in processes, rapidly lowering costs. Large firms take advantage of their capabilities in 
production, marketing and management as well as R&D. In many cases, larger firms with 
considerable capital and management resources absorb small innovative firms. 
The last stage of technological progress is specific. An industry and its market mature 
and price competition becomes more severe. In addition, the production process becomes 
more automated, integrated, systematized and specific. In this stage, only a highly 
standardized product system is in demand for competition with others. The innovation efforts 
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are diminished and only operational improvements replaced into the room of innovation 
effort. Finally, firms are becoming more reluctant to invest in R&D. Industry dynamism may 
be regenerated through new and fresh ideas introduced by new invaders or industries. Product 
life extension in this specific state may be an appropriate strategy when a series of additional 
changes (minor innovation) are taken place to add new values. Industries with technologies 
are typically transferred to catching-up countries where production costs are lower since most 
traditional manufacturing sectors in advanced countries lose their competitiveness to those in 
catching-up countries at this stage. 
However, it is possible that this model might change significantly according to 
changes in technoeconomic paradigm. For example, the spread of microelectronic technology 
like semiconductor across industries may allow mature industries to regenerate by becoming 
more flexible and information-intensive and by redesigning mature products. 
 
Technological Trajectory in Catching-up Countries 
 
In addition to the effort of Utterback (1994), Kim (1997) developed a three stage 
model which entails acquisition, assimilation, and improvement through researches on 
several different industries in Korea. The bottom part of figure 3-1 illustrates the model. 
In the early stage of industrialization, catching-up countries acquire mature foreign 
technologies from advanced industrialized countries. Becoming local capability is not able to 
accommodate production operations, domestic firms have to import foreign packages such as 
foreign technology including production know-how and specifications, imported components 
and parts, and production operational techniques, and appropriate technician invitation. Only 
standard product assemble is possible due to low labor costs and low technological capability.  
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After the implementation, technologies are quickly spread in the country, especially 
stealing experienced technical personnel from the early acquisition. Increased competition 
from newcomers leads to indigenous technical efforts such as imitative reverse engineering 
without direct transfer of foreign technologies in the assimilation of foreign technologies for 
production of differentiated items. Engineering and limited development rather than research 
is emphasized in this stage. 
Lastly, successful assimilation and emphasis on export promotion gradually 
increased domestic technological capability. Therefore, imported technologies are diffused to 
other activities through local efforts in research, development and engineering.  
This three-stage of technological trajectory in catching-up countries takes place not 
only in mature technology in the specific stage but also in growing and emerging 
technologies in the transition and fluid stages. 
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Figure 3-1  Integration of Two Technological Trajectories 
 
    Source: Kim (1997) 
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3.1.2. Government as an Environment Creator 
 
When we discuss about the role of government for enhancing technological progress, 
it is a common reaction to think about government intervention. As numerous literatures 
demonstrated, many East Asian governments intervened inclusively and they (but not all East 
Asian countries) succeeded in becoming industrialized countries.  
Those studies have a universal tendency that the government interventions in East 
Asian economies have focused on the role of selectivity in order to maximize effectiveness of 
limited resources in activities. Selectivity can be defined as the intensive investment of 
particular industries or sectors according to the government priority or picking winners. The 
selective policies can also be used together with a term of vertical policies because the 
intervention usually applies in a more direct way as a top-down approach in other word.  
However, there are other types of interventions: functionality and horizontality. 
Functional intervention is a policy for improving factor market such as improving capital, 
human resource, and information regardless particular sectors or industries. 
Horizontal interventions as pointed out by Teubal (1995 and 1997) are a collection of 
policies that addresses activities that markets are not capable to create in developing countries 
such as finance for innovation or R&D activities in enterprises. The horizontal intervention 
designs to provide specific economic benefits, but not to point selective industries or actors. 
Teubal mentioned that the horizontal policies attribute to stimulate generic technological 
activities that are socially desirable. The “Socially Desirable Technological Activities 
(SDTAs)” includes as such: technology transfer and diffusion, the promotion of industrial 
R&D, and the infrastructure development. The Asian NIEs adopted several horizontal 
policies to foster intensifying technological upgrade activities though adaption and absorption 
of imported technologies and it led to new technology creation later on. 
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Lall (2001) argues that technological development generally involves below three 
characteristics and he described economically justifiable policies for technological 
development as “Market-Stimulating Technology Policies (MSTPs).” The MSTPs included 
three major categories of policy: 
 
 Category 1 (Priorities): Setting national priorities for industrial and technological 
development in the broader context of economic and social objectives.  
 Category 2 (Incentives): Providing signals to economic agents for industrial or 
technological activity where markets fail to do so adequately. 
 Category 3 (Institutions): Generating non-market mechanisms, institutions and 
organizations, including policy mechanisms, to underpin the previous two categories. 
 
 The first category is a national priority setting. In the technology sphere, priority 
setting is generally chosen when a nation is eager to achieve higher technological growth 
within certain target and time period: launching more complex and new industry, increasing 
local innovative capabilities, and so on. 
 The second category is an incentive provision. Once national priorities have been 
made, next step is to give signals to economic agents to take action in response to those 
priorities. This involves the formulation and implementation of technology policies at the 
program level such as technology infrastructure provision program at the horizontal level, 
design of targeted subsidizing program on industrial training or research at the vertical level, 
and the inducement program on technologically demanding areas chose. Table 3-1 organizes 
several examples of horizontal and vertical technology policies. 
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Table 3-1  Examples of Horizontal and Vertical Technology Policy7  
Horizontal Technology Policy Vertical Technology Policy 
- Grants for enterprise R&D 
- Support of R&D personnel in SMEs 
- Teaching company scheme 
- Broad technology support to SMEs 
- Promotion of technology transfer 
- Support of cooperative pre-competitive 
consortia 
- Infant industry promotion of new activities 
- Subsidization and credit allocation for 
capital-intensive investments 
- Restricting FDI to build up local 
capabilities 
- Targeting strategic technologies for 
promotion in national laboratories 
- Financing private R&D in selected 
technologies 
- Targeting enterprises for R&D support in 
particular technologies 
- Subsidizing joint R&D by enterprises and 
institutions in specific areas 
- Building R&D institutions in selected 
activities 
- Providing subsidized credit for upgrading 
selected activities 
- Intervening in technology transfer processes 
to build specific capabilities. 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
 The third category is institution building. It can refer to establishment or 
institutionalization of appropriate policy mechanisms as a form of new institutions and 
organizations in the public or private sector in order to support the interaction between 
government and market agents. Examples in the public sector are technology institutions 
providing public (or semi-public) goods such as basic research, extension in services and 
standards for the private sector and it was supposed to the foster of large conglomerates 
                                           
7 In case of the Asian NIEs, they utilized more diverse vertical technology policies (or incentives) have been 
introduced than that of horizontal technology policies. This table, therefore, concentrates more on the vertical 
policy examples. 
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especially in Japan and Korea. Also competition policy, intellectual property protection or 
corporate governance provisions can be concerned in the stage. 
 
3.1.3. Technological Progress and Government Incentive 
 
Lall (1992) classified the determinants of technological development under 3 factors: 
incentive, factor market and institution. This study merges the second factor (factor market) 
into first factor which is incentive because only higher level of factor market can be helpful 
for technological development and in order to achieve higher standard of factor market 
government intervention with appropriate incentives would be crucial. Also skills, finance for 
technological activity and access to information within and beyond domestic as the most 
important factor markets should be created and generated by government incentives in order 
to motivate the economic agents to do industrial or technological activities. 
The main incentives inducing and enforcing investment in technological learning are 
macroeconomic environment, trade policy, domestic industrial policy, domestic demand and 
factor markets provision as depicted by Lall. The importance of good macro environment for 
sustainable upkeep of higher technology level is obvious and do not need to explain further 
detain here.  
As for trade policy, while it enters in trade, a country become realize its existing and 
non-existing comparative advantage and understand the concept of economies of scale in 
capital intensive or labor intensive activities. Facing severe competition in the global trade 
regime is a way of an effective stimulus and it would lead the country to enhance its 
technological capabilities. Close and frequent contact with export markets is an excellent way 
of acquiring advanced technologies. In case of developing countries (and as the Asian NIEs 
has been doing), trade market intervention would be necessary or essential prerequisite in 
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crude term because firms try to avoid massive investment in uncertain and high risk business 
in the free market system. Trade policy can turn those firms’ behavior into right director 
through provision subsidies. However, be aware that all such interventions are very difficult 
to design due to government needs enormous information and appropriate experiences. In 
case of Asian NIEs succeeded the polities under conditions as such: strong leadership 
commitment to competitiveness, flexibility in policy making, skilled and less corrupted 
bureaucracy, supporting interventions in factor markets, close interaction with industry, and 
exposures to export competition while retaining a protected domestic market as a discipline 
cushion both firms and the government. (World Bank 1993 and Lall 2001) 
 Domestic industrial policy is to remove market-unfriendly obstacles or barriers 
which oppose effective market mechanism and to create appropriate market-friendly system 
according to the national objectives. It would lead to the best stimulus to technological 
learning. Such as antitrust policies, intellectual property rights protection can play a crucial 
role. However, Asian NIEs especially Korea and Taiwan did not allow multinational 
corporations (MNCs) to enter their domestic market until domestic firms and market 
developed their own capabilities to compete with global market in terms of competitiveness 
and their size.  
 Domestic demand also plays an important role in influencing national capabilities as 
well as enterprises’ capabilities. The more intensity of competition happens, the better 
domestic quality of product has been made. Also, the size of domestic market not only on 
total incomes but also its distribution, greater equity with a broader base of demand 
influences the kinds of activates and the interaction among industries and firms. However, the 
lack of demand itself is a practical problem in many developing countries. Therefore, 
government intervention together with industrial policy and trade policy is needed to create 
the domestic demand for technological progress. 
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 Most important factors in technological progress are technical skills, finance for 
technological activity, and access to information, domestic and international. In order to 
improve skills, government promotes education and training programs and activities. At the 
beginning of industrialization, literacy rate and secondary education provision are crucial. As 
technologies become more demanding, the education system has to focus more on provision 
of specific technical, engineering and scientific education and training. Also underfinancing 
for technological activity would lead to market failures. Direct and subsidized policies to 
selected clusters, industries or firms are needed. Some Asian Tigers have been able to use 
them to promote industrial and technological development by carefully integrating them with 
other incentive and factor market interventions and imposing requirements on beneficiaries in 
terms of competitive performance in export markets (Stiglitz, 1996). Information accessibility 
is also vital to technological learning. Technology transfer via foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in Singapore or combination of Foreign Loan and technology transfer without FDI in Korea 
are good examples how to improve accessibility to technologies. There are diverse incentive 
policy examples as such (see Table 3-2). 
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Table 3-2  Examples of Incentive Policy 
 
Ø Quantitative and tariff restrictions on imports 
Ø Strong export subsidies and targeting 
Ø Subsidized and guided credit 
Ø Promotion of giant conglomerates 
Ø Boost enrollment on technical study and fields. 
Ø Industrial training was made by subsidies with considerable investment in 
government training institutions. 
Ø Infant industry promotion 
Ø Support of large firms to credit subsidization, technology targeting, FDI 
restrictions 
Ø Development of research institutions and extension services 
Ø Financing of links between industry and universities 
Ø Forced firms to invest in formal R&D to absorb new technologies to best 
practice levels, enter new areas and lower the costs of importing technology 
Ø Government targeted strategic technologies for promotion, often by getting 
private industry to collaborate with public research institutes in projects paid for 
by the government 
Ø The financing of technology expenditures was also fostered by a large number 
of subsidized credit and venture capital schemes (Korea has the largest 
indigenous venture and capital industry of developing countries in Asia). 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
 
3.1.4. Market as a Collection of Principal Agents of Technological Learning and Progress 
 
The foregoing government intervention does not actually suggest a solution as to 
why there exist different growth rates between catching-up countries and between firms 
within a nation. Several studies especially Lall (2001), Lall et al., (2003) and Kim (1997) 
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found the answer regarding the above question; that is technological change at the firm level. 
The studies depicted three representing factors to upgrade technological level as such: first, 
in-house effort in acquiring and intensifying knowledge; second, interactive framework not 
only between existing technological capability and its production experience (such as trial 
and error and experience accumulation) within a firm, but also between domestic and foreign 
technologies; third, R&D activities and interaction within a firm and with other domestic and 
international firms. Those efforts are induced or constrained under the interplay mechanism 
with the dynamic government intervention and incentive in particular the early stage of 
industrialization. 
In the initial stage of development, firms lack knowledge and experience on how to 
learn, assimilate and improve imported knowledge and equipment. In order to enhance its 
technological level, firms in developing countries usually acquire advanced technologies 
mainly from the industrialized or technologically advanced countries. Whereas explicit 
knowledge can be easily and equally transferred to all countries, the tacit knowledge and 
technology cannot do so. Because the tacit knowledge is not embodied into the transferred 
explicit knowledge such as equipments or instructions, patents, blueprints and books. 
Therefore, technological learning is needed a significant and intensified effort. Without 
deepen efforts of individuals or organizations within a firm to internalize such knowledge, 
technological learning and progress cannot take place. Kim (1997) emphasized that the 
intensity of effort or commitment is a more crucial element than existing tacit knowledge for 
long-term learning and competitiveness of firms. 
In addition, as technological capability at a firm is not the sum of explicit knowledge, 
but a collection of both tacit and explicit knowledge, national capability is also more than a 
sum of individual firm capabilities and it would be added up the variety of relevant factors 
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such as externalities, synergy, non-market mechanism, inter- and outer-firm’s networking and 
linkages, business operation, and systematic and supportive institution building.  
Absorptive capacity is also a critical mass. In order to upgrade the productivity of 
technological learning, first, existing tacit knowledge, as an essential element in technological 
learning, can play a role of influencing learning processes sustainably. In other word, today’s 
tacit knowledge should become a soil for tomorrow’s increased tacit knowledge through 
knowledge sharing activities within a firm. 
In the case of the Asian NIEs, government and firms sometimes created (either 
intended or unintended) crisis into the firms in order to upgrade its capability. When a crisis 
happens, discontinuous technological learning also takes place and firms get into trouble. 
Firms have to find out exit strategy in order to avoid the crisis and to deploy the crisis as a 
new momentum of market dominance in other sense. In such a case, the only firm that invests 
not only human capital but also capital goods heavily in order to acquire new tacit and 
explicit knowledge as well as knowledge exchange activities can survive and take a lead in 
the global market. A crisis can also be generated naturally when a firm loses its 
competitiveness in the domestic or international market. And when new coming top 
management or board member inject or propose challenging goals, crisis may be created. 
The strategic importance of top and middle management should not be overlooked in 
late industrialization. Their role is vital in discontinuous learning. It is entrepreneurial-
minded top management that introduces constructed crises. This forces discontinuous 
learning that articulates metaphors and symbols to give organizational directions, creates 
task-force teams to manage organization-wide learning process, provides resources to support 
learning activities to make crises creative, and clears away any obstacles in the learning 
process. Middle management translates the ideas of the top into reality on the shop floor in 
managing constructed crises. 
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Other findings are as such: all acquiring knowledge should be customized into firms’ 
characteristics since each firm may have a different learning experience; firms in developing 
countries usually do not know how to utilize the learning technologies for enhancing its 
capabilities, so, enterprises may not be able to estimate how much and how many days they 
do contribute for building up their capabilities; different technologies can also have different 
degrees of dependence on interaction with outside sources of knowledge or information; 
technological learning in a firm does not take place in isolation and the process is rife with 
externalities and inter-linkages (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986). 
 
 
3.1.5. Individual Firm’s Absorptive Capacity and Innovation 
 
 A number of researches have been conducted regarding individual firm’s absorptive 
capacity and innovation. According to Cohen and Levinthal (1990), an individual firm’s 
absorptive capacity, which they defined to be an ability to recognize value of new, external 
information and apply it to commercial ends, is critical to the firm’s innovative capabilities. 
At the most elemental level, this prior knowledge includes basic skills or even a shared 
language but may also include knowledge of the most recent scientific or technological 
developments in a given field. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) also show that the absorptive 
capacity is correlated with the firm's level of prior related knowledge. They argue that the 
ability to exploit external knowledge is considered to be a critical component of innovative 
capabilities and the ability to evaluate and utilize outside knowledge is largely a function of 
the level of prior related knowledge. In other words, the development of absorptive capacity 
and innovative performance are dependent on the works or experiences done in the past. In 
this regard, prior related knowledge allows the firms to have higher absorptive capacities and 
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lack of investment in an area of expertise would undermine future development of a technical 
capability in the area.  
 At the organizational level, March and Simon (1958) showed that a majority of 
innovations result from borrowing rather than invention. This argument is supported by 
extensive research on the sources of innovation conducted by Hamberg (1963), Myers and 
Marquis (1969), Johnston and Gibbons (1975), and von Hippel (1988). For example, von 
Hippel showed that as an organization develops a broad and active network of internal and 
external relationships, individuals’ awareness of others’ capabilities and knowledge is 
strengthened, and thus the absorptive capacities of the individuals and organization are 
upgraded.  
 At the level of the firm, absorptive capacity is generated in a variety of ways. Studies 
by Tilton (1971), Allen (1977), and Mowery (1983) show that firms that conduct their own 
R&D could better utilize externally available information. This implies that absorptive 
capacity may be created as a byproduct of a firm's R&D investment. According to Abernathy 
(1978) and Rosenberg (1982), through direct involvement in manufacturing, a firm is better 
able to recognize and exploit new information relevant to a particular product market. For 
example, production experience provides the firm with the background necessary both to 
recognize the value of and implement methods to reorganize or automate particular 
manufacturing processes. In this regard, firms invest in absorptive capacity directly in a 
number of ways including sending personnel for advanced technical training.  
 The importance to innovative performance of information originating from other 
internal units in the firm, outside the formal innovating unit such as R&D laboratory for 
marketing and manufacturing, is well recognized by a number of researchers. For example, 
Mansfield (1968) showed that a firm’s absorptive capacities could be increased through 
cross-function interfaces that allow some amount of redundancy in expertise. In fact, 
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according to Clark and Fujimoto (1987), Japanese firms that rotate their R&D personnel 
through marketing and manufacturing operations were able to enhance diversity of 
background of their personnel that is positively related with the firm’s absorptive capacities. 
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3.2. Analytical Framework of Technological Learning 
 
The process of technological learning and progress at the government level as well as 
at firms’ level is extremely dynamic and complex. Therefore, explaining or analyzing the 
complete nature of technological change is almost impossible. At the same time, it is also 
very difficult to simplify the concept with one simple analytical tool. Nevertheless, in this 
chapter, the study attempts to explain the dynamic learning process in simplified terms based 
on Korea’s industrialization experience (Figure 3-2). This chapter introduces a 
comprehensive analytical framework consisting of two interrelated frameworks: government 
incentives and market response. These frameworks are used as tools to analyze both 
incremental and discontinuous learning of Korea. 
 As the government has influenced or has been influenced by market and technology 
environment, it affects all aspects of technological progress to the market through diverse 
policy instruments and incentive programs. From the technology perspective, the government 
in the early stage of industrialization, in particular, creates the demand of technology in the 
name of industrial policies and supplies technological requirements through science and 
technology policies. In response to the government incentives, the market undertakes its role 
seriously if the incentives coincide with the purpose of economic units at the market: serving 
qualified goods and services with low cost in order to meet the needs of customers. 
At the firm level, a firm can improve its technological capability by interacting with the 
international and domestic community. It can also upgrade its technology level though 
internal efforts such as trial and error, experience and production know-how accumulation, 
and R&D activities.  
 Figure 3-2 Analytical Framework
Source: Author’s construction
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3.2.1. Framework of Government Incentives  
 
 The framework of government incentives (Figure 3-3) is designed to analyze the 
government intervention consisting of various policies and incentives for technological 
industrialization in catching-up countries. In fact, the role of government in the early stage of 
development is a critical mass as many scholars concluded the role of government was one of 
key instruments for being industrialization in Asian NICs8. 
 Since most developing countries do not have enough resources for all industries, the 
government usually plays a role as a facilitator or a leader in order to maximize the 
effectiveness of the resource allocation through appropriate intervention and incentives to the 
market. In that sense, the government gives influence on the technological progress under the 
overall approach of the nation’s development agenda with direct and indirect policy 
instruments. Such policies affect a firm’s interactions with the international community by 
regulating the inflow of foreign technology. They also affect the firm’s interactions with the 
domestic community by influencing the availability and efficacy of local supporting 
institutions and the quality of educational institutions.  
 The government intervention was a fundamental background not only to create new 
industries and market but also to operate the market and industries in a sound way. Market 
mechanism perspective includes both the demand side of technological development that 
creates market needs for technological change and the supply side of technological 
development that strengthens technological capability. In this study, we define that the former 
                                           
8 See the references: Competitiveness, FDI and Technological Activity in East Asia (Lall et al., 2003), The four 
Little Dragons: The Spread of Industrialization in East Asia (Vogel, 1991), and The East Asian Miracle: 
Economic Growth and Public Policy (World Bank, 1993). 
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is realized by industrial policies and the latter is attained by science and technology policies9. 
In other words, first, industrial policy is designed to define and build up market needs for the 
necessity and appropriateness of technological learning and to motivate the demand side of 
technology continuously; second, science and technology policy is planned to satisfy the 
market needs created by the industrial policy through provision of technological capability. 
 The government policy is also corresponded with market and technology 
environment domestically and internationally. When there is a crisis in either domestic or 
international market, the government recognizes and adjusts its policies to a more appropriate 
way in response to the crisis. When also a new market or technology paradigm is introduced, 
the government has to make policy changes into right direction and circumstance. At the 
same time, the government can give influence to the market and technology by creating a 
new intervention toward market. 
 In addition, this study emphasizes the importance of effective linkages between the 
policies as a key to attain industrialization. Also the linkages between the two catalyze with 
involvement of incentive mechanism. The policies after all lead the market to response to the 
government incentives. Especially, in the early stage of industrialization, policy coordination 
is critical to derive market’s active response to intensify its efforts for technological upgrade. 
                                           
9 In some cases, the role of industrial policy for demand of technology and science and technology policy for 
supply of technology can be reoriented according to a country’s context. However, this framework is developed 
based on Korea’s development experience in early stage. Even in the Korea case, industrial policy has also 
played a role to supply technology from the 1980s. It is discussed in the following chapter (Korea case). 
 Figure 3-3  Government Incentive 
Source: Author’s construction
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3.2.2. Framework of Market Dynamism 
 
As figure 3-4 shows, there are three main sources where activities of technology 
transfer and diffusion for enhancing technological capability take place: international 
community, domestic community, and individual firm’s efforts.  
First, international community is a very important channel of technological learning 
for firms in catching-up countries. Learning unfamiliar or new technologies, utilizing 
international expertise and experts, upgrading ability through technology assimilation, and 
screening valuable technologies are examples of how to deploy international sources. 
Frequent contacts to international community help firms become more proactive to seek 
technological opportunities and develop a broad and active network with the community. 
Second group is the domestic community. Technological capability is also improved by 
interactions and interplays with domestic players such as universities, GRIs, public support 
agencies, buyers and suppliers, and other firms. Like examples we mentioned above, 
including international community, domestic community also help firms utilize domestic 
resources in the way of exchanging knowledge, expertise and experts, and of improving an 
eye for technological value. The most significant benefit of domestic interaction is to 
organize joint research projects among Government Research Institutes (GRIs), private firms, 
and universities. The Asia NICs usually utilize such a joint project in the form of a contract-
based program funded by their government (Lee, 2010). 
Last but at least, firm’s in-house effort is the core concept of upgrading technological 
capabilities within the market dynamism framework. By interacting with international and 
domestic community, a firm can accumulate knowledge and improve its level of technology 
on the basis of its intensifying efforts. On the gained knowledge base together with 
devotional and passionate manpower within a firm, the firm can initiate innovation in 
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operation, process, and production continuously. Such existing technological capability, 
production experience and trial and error with the government policy and incentive 
coordination are the main sources for technological progress and capability at the firm. Most 
importantly, once a firm has improved its technological capability, indigenous R&D activities 
take place and it becomes the main innovation engine for upgrading the firm’s technological 
capability.  
 In addition, proactive and appropriate crisis management and organizational culture 
also contribute to the technological progress. For either intended or unintended crisis or either 
government originated or naturally created crisis, firms are openly exposed to enormous 
emergency situation and crisis environment. When there is a crisis, daily technological 
learning processes lose their continuity and activities of sustainable technological progress 
have been disconnected. It leads a firm into new challenges. In order to overcome those crises, 
a firm has to find a solution to continue its competitiveness in the market. Attaining such a 
healthy organization, following characteristics have to be in place: efficiency and 
effectiveness, productivity, lower turnover rate, acceptance and appreciation for diversity, 
respect, pride and enthusiasm, revitalization of communication, and strong sense of goal and 
vision.  
 Figure 3-4  Market Dynamism
Source: Author’s construction
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4. Evolutionary Process of Technological Learning in Korea 
 
4.1. Overview of Korea’s Technological Learning 
 
Technological progress is a key determinant of economic growth. As many scholars 
pointed out, it is one of key measures that can analyze and explain the success or failure of a 
country’s economic development. The Korean government also recognized the technological 
learning and progress as a main growth engine of catching-up to achieve an advanced 
economy. 
In the early 1960s, Korea had just experienced massive and tragic historical events 
such as the period of Japanese colony and Korean War. Korea was a country with no hope 
and suffered from almost all problems most resource-poor and low-income countries were 
facing at the time. In 1962, Korea’s per capita gross national income (GNI) was less than that 
of Lao PDR and most African countries such as Malawi and Mali10. But beginning in 1962, 
the Korean economy grew from $87 in 1962 to $20,759 in 2010 (see Table 4-1) which is now 
more than 20 times that of Lao PDR and a world of difference with that of African countries11. 
Nowadays, Korea ranks thirteenth among the world’s top economic powers in terms of total 
GNI and sixth in terms of manufacturing value-added (World Bank Database). As table 4-1 
shows, Korea has also achieved phenomenal growth in its exports, which increased from a 
mere $55 million in 1962 to $ 466 billion in 2010. Ezra Vogel concludes, “No nation has tried 
harder and come so far so quickly, from handicrafts to heavy industry, from poverty to 
                                           
10 Korea’s GNI per capital (constant 2000 US$ term) was $1,420. That of Lao PDR, Malawi and Mali was 
$1,528, $2,265, and $2,529 respectively (World Bank Database). 
11 Lao PDR’s GNI per capital in 2010 (currency US$ term) is $1,010. That of Malawi and Mali is $330 and 
$600 respectively (there are no constant 2000 US$ data) (World Bank Database). 
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prosperity, from inexperienced leaders to modern planners, managers, and engineers (Vogel, 
1991).” 
How have Korea and Korean firms managed to achieve such an unexpected growth 
in industrialization in only three decades? What are the major factors behind the growth? The 
answer is technological change. There are several driving forces underlying the dynamic 
process from imitation to innovation in Korea: 1) Korean War shook traditional 
Confucianism country of Korea to a rather flexible and classless society; 2) strong 
government intervention with incentive mechanism; 3) large conglomerates (chaebols) which 
served as engines; 4) talented but hard working Koreans who empowered these engines; 5) 
export-oriented strategy that forced Korean firms out into higher global competition; 6) 
frequent crisis occurrence as a major means of hasty technological learning, 7) interplay 
between government and market. 
 From the technology perspective, rapid industrialization of Korea in 1960s and 1970s 
stemmed largely from imitative activities such as products on a large scale knockoffs or 
clones of mature foreign products or original equipment manufacturing (OEM) products. 
Those imitative efforts fortunately were neither patent infringement nor pirating proprietary 
know-now (Kim, 1997). A study shows that 60 percent of patented innovations were imitated 
legally within four years of their introduction (Mansfield, 1984).  
 In 1980s, Korea started to increase its creative imitation activities (it was called 
creative Japanese-style imitation in many literatures). Especially when Korea’s science and 
technology policy focused more on R&D activities in the middle of 1980s, Korea 
transformed itself as an innovator as well as a creative imitator. Newly launching national 
programs such as National R&D Program in 1982 and Highly Advanced National (HAN) 
Project in 1992 could become a momentum of the role interchange between government and 
private sector. The private R&D has been turned to key activities for technological learning 
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and progress. 1982 was the starting point of turning around the ratio of R&D expenditure in 
GDP between government and private sector (Figure 4-1). Several industries such as 
semiconductors, electronics, and biotechnology could accomplish in the results of increasing 
R&D expenditure. 
 
Figure 4-1  Gross Expenditure on Research and Development in Korea, 1964-2005
 
Source: Suh et al. (2007) 
 
From the late 1980s and 1990s, Korea’s creative innovation in selective industries 
started by intensified in-house R&D activities and participation in global networks. And 
finally Korea’s aspiration to become one of global leading industries has been actualized 
gradually. 
With above discussion, this study will try to find answers on how Korea acquired the 
technological capability to undertake duplicative imitations – by reverse engineering – in the 
1960s and 1970s. Also the following chapter will analyze how Korea accumulated enough 
capability to conduct creative imitations and innovations in the 1980s and 1990s. 
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Table 4-1  Major Economic Indicators of Korea 
  1962 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Population (millions) 26.5 32.2 35.2 38.1 40.8 42.9 45.1 47.0 48.1 48.9 
GNI (US$ billions) 
 
8.2 21.4 63.3 96.1 270.2 529.2 530.8 843.9 1,014.6 
GDP growth rate (%) 2.2a 4.6b 7.3 -1.9 7.5 9.3 8.9 8.8 4.0 6.2 
GNI per capita (US$) 87c 255 607 1,660 2,355 6,303 11,735 11,292 17,531 20,759 
Exports (US$ millions) 55 835 5,081 17,505 30,283 65,016 125,058 172,268 284,419 466,384 
Structure of GDP 
          
Primary (Agriculture, mining, etc.) (%) 40d 28.1 26.5 16.2 13.7 9.2 6.7 4.9 3.6 2.6 
Manufacturing (%) 18d 21.0 25.9 28.2 29.3 29.2 26.7 28.3 27.5 30.6 
Utilities (%) 4.7d 6.6 5.9 10.1 10.6 13.7 12.1 9.4 9.9 8.5 
Service (%) 32.1d 42.2 41.7 45.5 46.5 47.9 54.6 57.3 59.0 58.2 
Structure of Manufacturing 
          
Light Industry (%) 68.6d 60.8 52.1 46.4 41.5 34.1 23.6 16.7 9.0 6.4 
Heavy & Chemical Industry (inc. IT) (%) 31.4d 39.2 47.9 53.6 58.5 65.9 76.4 83.3 91.0 93.6 
Source: Author's compilation from Korea Statistical Information Service (KOSIS) and Korea International Trade Association (KITA) 
Note: All currency is in current U.S. dollars. 
a = GNP growth rate, b = GNP growth rate in 1972, c = GNP per capita, d = 1965 data 
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4.2. Government Incentives: Role of Government from an Organizer to a Facilitator 
  
 During the catching-up period, the role of the government was crucial and 
compulsory in Korea. The Korean government made a significant impact on the process of 
technological learning through both direct and indirect measures such as industrial, trade, and 
science and technology policies. The industrial policy was designed to create market needs 
for technological learning and to strengthen the demand side of technology continuously12. 
The science and technology policy was implemented to catch up the market needs by 
increasing national S&T capabilities (Figure 3-3). 
In addition, those policies with appropriate incentive programs play a critical role of 
compelling the firm to intensify its activities to learn foreign and advanced technologies for 
technological advance in the early stage of industrialization. It means that the government 
incentive could create such an eco-system of interaction between government and market in a 
sound way (Figure 3-2). 
In this vein, this part introduces the classification of government intervention into 
demand and supply side and explains how those interventions are correlated and are forced 
by incentive mechanism. 
 
  
                                           
12 In fact, the role of industrial policy in Korea has been changed. Korean government deployed the industrial 
policy as an anchor of creating demand on technology from the market until early 1980s. However, economic 
environment of Korea had become unfavorable because of global protectionism and liberalization, and rapid 
expansion of market needs and dynamism. After all, the government changed its position from rule- and target-
setter to market supporter. Together with the change, the role of industrial policy has also become changed to 
support both demand and supply of technology such as R&D targeting with financing support. 
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4.2.1. Demand of Technology: Industrial Policy and Incentives 
 
 Many developing countries, especially low-income nations still remain to be in the 
condition of no resource, no industry, and even no modern market. Under this condition, in 
order to create new dynamics of industrial growth, the government needs to use a package of 
direct and indirect policy instruments to define growth targets and discipline businesses. 
These instruments have largely been employed toward the following objectives: first, 
intentional creation or promotion of business entities (bigger is better in the early stage of 
industrialization because of economics of scale); second, ambitious export-oriented 
industrialization (EOI), achieved by pushing the private sector into crisis situation; third, the 
promotion of highly advanced target industries (heavy and chemical industry (HCI) was 
promoted in case of Korea); and fourth, generalizing culture of mutual understanding in 
economic growth and appropriate response to the external environment. 
 
Business Agent Promotion  
 
In order to overcome the disadvantage from having an immature (and/or a small) 
domestic market and to build up international level of competitiveness in a short period of 
time, it is important to create large and proactive firms. It is because of its market domination 
and influence, conglomerates in developing counties can upgrade economic wealth of their 
countries rapidly. In case of Korea, to satisfy the above conditions, the government supported 
creation of multi-conglomerates (chaebols in Korean) consisting of corporate enterprises 
engaged in diversified business fields and typically owned and managed by one or multi- 
interrelated family groups. 
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Within this format, the government could help capital formation as well as the 
subsequent diversification toward the created business agents. Selling selected local 
enterprises or giving various big import-substitution projects that expects higher profit on 
favorable terms, providing preferential financing and foreign currency13, the government 
guaranteed foreign loans in 1960s and 1970s were one of good examples of the Korean 
government. 
These efforts led to the creation of world-class multinational corporations. Samsung, 
Hyundai and LG started to rank among Fortune magazine’s 100 largest industrial 
corporations in the world since1990s. In 2011 Fortune global 500, Korea with 14 MNCs is 
ranked 6th among the countries with the most Global 500 companies (Fortune Magazine, July 
2011). 
In the process of promoting chaebols, the Korean government effectively disciplined 
the chaebols by penalizing poor performers and rewarding only good ones (or stick and carrot 
approach). Good performers were rewarded with further licenses to expand in more lucrative 
sectors. This is a unique and different approach compared to other developing nations. 
Despite those weakness and side effects such as main culprit of Korea IMF period, 
chaebols played a crucial role in the rapid technological upgrading in the early stage and in 
the attaching world talents as well as drastically expanding and deepening R&D activities in 
1980s and 1990s. 
  
                                           
13 The government’s preferential loan was given with about half or less interest rates compared to the real 
market rates. Also, after the currency devaluation in 1964 in order to make sure of comparative advantage of 
Korea export products, foreign debt burdens resulting from the currency devaluation were compensated with 
increased low-interest loans, further reducing the risks for chaebols’ businesses. 
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Export-oriented Policy 
 
Even though import-substitution policy helps to create demand for technological 
progress via foreign technology transfer, the export-oriented strategy is a more effective 
policy14. The most well-known success stories of four Asian tigers demonstrate and support 
this argument. In case of Korea, the government considers export as a life-or-death struggle 
in order to achieve its economic growth goals. The Korean government designated strategic 
industries for import substitution and export promotion (1960s: plywood, textiles, consumer 
electronics, automobile, and 1970s: steel, shipbuilding, construction services, machinery). 
Because some strategic industries were created in violation of their comparative 
advantage, those efforts had to suffer infant-industry growing pains from high costs and risks 
to lack of technology. To overcome the problems, the government sheltered the domestic 
market from foreign competition. 
The government introduced a concept of the export promotion from the revised first 
five-year economic development plan in 1964. To assess industrial performance, annual 
targets on each industry were assigned to related divisions of Ministry of Trade and Industry 
in Korea as well as related industrial associations. Monthly report on monitoring export 
performance was submitted to the monthly export promotion meeting led by the president 
himself. Cabinet members, heads of major financial institutions, business association leaders 
and business leaders all attended the meeting and 177 meetings from 1963 to 1979 were held. 
The meeting was a platform for the stakeholders to share ideas and remind of export 
targets and to identify and solve facing problems of export related issues. If a project was 
                                           
14 The average annual economic growth rate for EOI countries was 9.5 and 7.7 percent, respectively, for 1963-
1973 and 1973-1985 compared with 4.1 and 2.5 percent for ISI countries. The real per capita income growth 
rate was 6.9 and 5.9 percent for the same periods for the former as compared with 1.6 and - 0.1 for the latter, as 
the ISI group had a higher population growth rate (Kim, 1997). 
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delayed compared to the original planned schedule, the causes were analyzed and a decision 
on corrective action was taken, often on the spot by the president’s decision.  
The stick and carrot approach was carefully and effectively used for the meeting. 
Sticks in the form of administrative guidance forced firms to reach its goals. If a firm did not 
respond as expected to particular goals, its tax returns, government credit guarantees, 
preferential bank loans and any other government support were subject to be suspended 
without hesitation. 
In the meantime, government also provided massive incentives to the firms with 
great export performance. Borrowing tremendous loans from domestic banks with lower 
market interest rates, tariff and value-added taxes exemptions, duty-free imports of raw 
materials and spare parts had been given into export-oriented investments as a carrot. These 
incentives constituted the Korea’s export promotion system. With these incentives, chaebols 
could grow even larger and faster due to their greater organizational, financial, and political 
leverage and its combination. 
The monthly meeting also provided a venue of beauty contest for government 
bureaucratic. Working-level officials could report to President Park directly and high 
performing officials who accomplished ahead of the planned export-targeting could award a 
fast promotion. 
 While it created new business opportunities, however, it also created crises for firms 
to invest heavily in technological learning to acquire foreign technologies and improve them 
in order to survive in the highly competitive global market. 
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Strategic Industry Promotion 
 
In order to achieve industrialization, the Korean government understood the 
necessity of restructuring the economy from labor-intensive and light industries to more 
technology-intensive and heavy industries. And they realized the importance of technological 
capability to do so. 
Especially, the change of international political regime prompted the Korean 
government to massively invest for the heavy and chemical industry program. Because of 
anti-war movement after the virtual defeat of Vietnamese War, Nixon announced (so called 
Nixon Doctrine) not to commit its military forces in Asian future conflicts, and the Nixon 
administration withdrew one of two U.S. Army divisions from Korea in 1971. 
President Park became obsessed with acquiring a self-reliant national defense 
capability by developing heavy and chemical industries (HCIs) at a far greater intensity and 
in a far shorter time than previous plans in his mind. The HCI plan included six industries: 
steel, nonferrous metal, machinery (including automobile), shipbuilding, industrial 
electronics and petrochemical. 
According to Lee (1991), the Korean government invested 906.3 billion Korean won 
from 1973 when the government formally announced the new lunching HCI promotion plan 
to the public to 1981 and it was about 13% of economic development budget (Table 4-2)15. 
As a result, accumulation of HCIs investment and “three lows” – low oil price, low interest 
rate, low US dollar value against Korean won (won depreciation) and high US dollar value 
against Japanese yen and deutsche mark (appreciation) – in 1986 led to reboost Korean 
                                           
15 HCI investment share within total manufacturing investment of Korean government from 1973 to 1979 was 
more than 75 percent (Kim, 1997). 
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economy. Table 4-3 shows demonstrate the double-digit economic growth was led by HCI 
industries. 
 
Table 4-2  Trends in size of government budget support for HCD programs: 1970-81  
Year 
Total central 
government 
budget  
(A) 
(billion KRW) 
Budget for 
economic 
development 
expenditures  
(B) 
(billion KRW) 
Budgetary 
support for HCI  
(C) 
(billion KRW) 
Percentage of 
total budget 
devoted to HCI 
support  
(C/A) (%) 
Percentage of 
economic 
development 
expenditures 
devoted to HCI 
support  
(C/B) (%) 
1970 446.3 121.8 17.2 3.9 14.1 
1971 555.3 153.0 29.4 5.3 19.2 
1972 709.3 209.0 80.6 11.4 38.6 
1973 659.7 143.5 13.6 2.1 9.5 
1974 1,038.3 222.8 40.6 3.9 18.2 
1975 1,586.9 397.0 80.8 5.1 20.4 
1976 2,258.5 576.5 123.0 5.4 21.3 
1977 2,744.6 654.7 91.3 3.3 13.9 
1978 3,517.0 716.1 137.0 3.9 19.1 
1979 4,905.7 1,431.9 93.2 1.9 6.5 
1980 6,118.2 1,338.8 222.0 3.6 16.6 
1981 8,040.0 1,493.9 104.8 1.3 70.0 
Source: Lee (1991) 
 
 
Table 4-3  Trends in growth rate between GDP and HCI 
  1980  1982  1984  1986  1988  Average 1986-88 
GDP growth rate -1.9  8.3  9.9  12.2  11.7  12.1  
Manufacturing growth rate -0.7  6.7  17.3  18.4  13.0  16.5  
     HCI -2.9  8.9  20.4  20.9  17.0  20.2  
     Others 1.4  4.4  13.6  15.0  7.1  11.4  
Source: Author's compilation from Korea Statistical Information Service (KOSIS) and Lee (1991) 
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The concentrating effort toward HCIs triggers several crisis situations in 
technological learning. Due to their limited technological capability, the chaebols had to rely 
only on foreign (and advanced) technology. They had to acquire and assimilate imported 
technology simultaneously in a short period time. Furthermore, in order to meet government 
intention, they had to upgrade their own technological capacity and capability in succession. 
The chaebols had to survive from a life-or-death struggle forced by government. 
The heavy investment toward HCIs, however, created several problems. Under a 
desperate situation, government utilized the HCIs promotion strategy more for military 
purposes than for economic rationality. It resulted in a rapid rise in foreign debt from $2.2 
billion in 1970 to $27.1 billion in 1980 (Bello et al., 1990). It also caused misallocation of 
resources (mainly financing support), rapid inflation and wage increase compared with the 
productivity gain, and absolute dominance of few chaebols in Korea society. 
 
Economic Environment Change 
 
Since the global economic environment had been changed significantly in 1980s, 
Korean government had to change its strategy in order to maintain sustainable economic 
growth. There were several structuring issues: 1) the global economy had began to downturn 
in the 1980s and countries like Korea had been seriously affected because of its export-
dependent economy; 2) Attempt to overcome the economic recession, advanced countries 
initiated protectionist policies and it also led Korea in difficult situation; 3) rapid increase of 
inflation and wage resulted Korea in losing its comparative advantage in low-wage and labor-
intensity (or light) industries16; 4) other developing countries (especially countries like 
                                           
16 Real annual wage growth rose to 5.8 percent in the 1960s (annual term) and 7.5 percent in the 1970s (annual 
term) (Kim, 1997). 
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Thailand, Malaysia and China influenced by remarkable economic transform of Korea) with 
much lower wage and cost were rapidly catching up with Korea in the industries; 5) Since 
Korea got becoming a bigger player in the global society and tried to, industrialized countries, 
particularly Japan, started to be unwilling to transfer their technology to Korea; 6) 
international society became to require Korea to change its law of Intellectual Property Right 
(IPR) that Korea internalized imitative reverse engineering foreign technology. 
Under unfavorable circumstances, the Korean government had to set out on a major 
policy shift. It attempted to reduce government intervention, introduce market mechanism 
and develop more technology-required industries. Also, antitrust legislation, trade 
liberalization, financial liberalization, promotion of small and medium-size enterprises, 
foreign investment liberalization, and shifting emphasis on innovation-related activities had 
been introduced. 
In short, the focus of industrial policy related to creating the demand for 
technological learning had shifted significantly. Whereas remarkable heavy government 
intervention was made in the early stage of development, government turned it to the 
introduction of market principles in order to enhancing international competition and 
particularly government started to control chaebols’ privileges from the 1980s. Even though 
government's role as an interventionist has substantially weakened, but the government still 
remains to be relatively powerful in Korea compared with other countries. 
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4.2.2. Supply of Technology: Science and Technology Policy and Incentives 
 
For economic development, government intervention for creating demand for 
technology through industrial policy cannot alone attain the goal; instead the government also 
needs to stimulate the supply of technological capability and capacity through science and 
technology policy. This section introduces Korea’s experience of policy instrument for 
technological upgrading. Technology transfer, technology diffusion, and indigenous R&D 
provide insight into understanding how developing countries catch up with advanced 
countries. 
 
Technology Transfer 
 
In order to fill the lacking technological capability, Korea had no choice except to 
rely on foreign technology. Whereas many NICs such as Singapore, Hong Kong and even 
Taiwan acknowledge the importance of foreign direct investment (FDI), Korea tightened its 
FDI control17. Korea promoted technology transfer through other sources such as capital 
goods, reverse engineering, and turnkey package, instead of restricting itself to FDI. Foreign 
loan was received to acquire capital. As for foreign licensing (FL), Korea restricted to 
associate with technical assistance of turnkey plant package. We surmise Korea’s policy on 
FDI may prefer to defend Korea’s independence from MNCs because of Korea’s historical 
invasion from strong neighbors. 
The preference of the importation of capital goods, reverse engineering and turnkey 
package led Korea to massive imports of foreign capital goods through foreign borrowings. 
                                           
17 Korea’s stock of FDI in 1983 was only 7 percent whereas that of Singapore was about 23 percent and less 
than half that of Taiwan and Hong Kong. Also, the proportion of FDI to total external loans was only 6.1 percent 
in Korea compared with 91.9 percent in Singapore, 45 percent in Taiwan (Kim, 1997). 
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Also, various factors stimulated the inflow of foreign capital goods to Korea. Depreciation of 
Korean won against US dollar, tariff exemptions on imported capital goods and financing 
support with lower interest rates generated a favorable environment for capital goods imports. 
However, Korea which had high tendency to rely on capital goods faced new 
challenges in 1980s. In order to acquire and assimilate more sophisticated foreign 
technologies for maintaining its international competitiveness, Korea had to open up more its 
market to FDI and FL. Responding to the complaints about bureaucratic redtape, the Korean 
government introduced automatic approval system and launched diverse tax reduction and 
incentive programs. Also, Korea established Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Corporation 
(KOTRA) aiming as a one-stop service center. Also, FL has been completely open for all 
industries and for all terms and conditions. The approval system for FL has been changed to 
reporting system. As a results, FLs increased rapidly from 247 in 1981 to 707 in 1993 (KIM, 
1997). However, FDI had not come to Korea as expected because big FDI players like 
Singapore has been settled down. 
For technology transfer Korea relied on both Japan and the United States intensely. 
According to Kim’s finding (1997), eighty percent of FDI, seventy percent of FLs and capital 
goods took part in Korea from 1962 to 1993. 
 
Technology Diffusion 
 
From the national economic perspectives, technology diffusion is as important as the 
learning from foreign technology in the form of technology transfer. On the basis of 
recognition of the importance of technology diffusion, the Korean government initiatives and 
established various specialized diffusion agents such as Korea Institute of Science and 
Technology (KIST) and Korea Scientific and Technological Information Center (KORSTIC). 
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However, these agents turned out to be less effective in diffusing technology due to their 
limited experiences on commercializing technology and absorptive capacity. 
The Korean government planned to develop domestic capital goods sector but it was 
not workable until 1970s. In order to emerge local engineering service firms and to provide 
opportunities to learn foreign experiences, the government promoted the Engineering Service 
Promotion Law in 1973 and Korea Engineering and Consulting Association (KENCA) was 
renewed to support the government intention. However, domestic capability to provide 
engineering service was far behind to realize. Also, government founded KORSTIC in 1962 
to disseminate technical information but its usage was quite limited because firms could 
easily acquire and assimilate advanced (but not hi-tech) technology directly from foreigners. 
In 1966, Korean government established the first centralized and integrated government 
research institute (GRI), KIST18, to support private firms about technological barriers. KIST 
played such an important role in 1960s and 1970s such as Preliminary feasibility study on 
POSCO, semiconductor technology transfer to Samsung and others. Unlike dominance on 
pure and basic research projects in major GRIs of developing countries, KIST (and other 
GRIs in Korea at that time) was designed to provide, commercialize, apply, industrial-
oriented research works. However, researchers in KIST, mostly from academia or R&D 
centers in advanced countries, faced difficulties in playing their role as a technology 
diffusioner due to lack of experiences in commercialization and transferring of technologies 
to private sector and had no management know-how. 
Only from 1980s, Korea could formulate a certain network framework among 
government, public and private (but nonprofit) institutes. The new network framework could 
                                           
18 KIST is a key agency for technological consulting in Korea. In 1960s and 1970s, KIST made significant 
contributions to the industrialization of Korea by helping industries identify, adopt, and assimilate new 
technologies. It also played a role of seed-bed of the Korean S&T as many government-financed have spun off 
from KIST since the 1970s. 
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support and stimulate private firms to intensify their business activities. Government itself 
plays a role as a secretariat to coordinate with different agencies related to the technology 
diffusion. National Industrial Technology Institute together with regional industrial 
technology institutes and the Small and Medium Industry Promotion Corporation provide 
services on industrial technology. The Korea Academy of Industrial Technology together with 
GRIs collaborates to diffuse their R&D activities. Private but nonprofit organizations such as 
the Korea Standard Association and the Korea Productivity Center provide education and 
training programs on quality control, value engineering, physical distribution and factory 
automation. 
 
Indigenous Research and Development 
 
Since Korea’s industries became technology-intensive, the government had to adjust 
its policy with no R&D plan to policy with R&D programs. As a government, there are two 
well-known policy instruments: 1) direct R&D investment program; and 2) indirect R&D 
incentive program. Provision of R&D infrastructure and fund to R&D agents are examples of 
direct intervention. In case of indirect supports, tax reduction and preferential finance are 
representative examples. 
As a result, total R&D expenditure by Korean government was only 10.5 billion 
Korean won in 1970 to 37.9 trillion in 2009 (see Table 4-4). As for the R&D share of GDP 
increased dramatically from 0.38 percent to 3.57 percent during the same period. Korea is 
now ranked 4th in term of R&D/GDP share in the World19 and its growing rate is faster than 
that of GDP during the same period. The government’s effort to induce investment to R&D 
                                           
19 1st: Israel (4.86%, 2008), 2nd: Finland (4.01%, 2009), 3rd: Sweden (3.75%, 2008) (Ministry of Education, 
Science and Technology) 
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activities in private sector contributes to rapid increase in number of researchers and number 
of corporate R&D centers. 
 
Table 4-4  Research and Development Expenditures 
 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 
R&D Expenditure 
(billion KRW) 
2.1 10.5 42.7 282.5 1,237.1 3,349.9 9,440.6 13,848.5 24,155.4 37,928.5 
R&D/GDPa (%) 0.26 0.38 0.42 0.77 1.58 1.95 2.50 2.30 2.79 3.57 
Researcher/10,000 
Population 
0.7 1.7 2.9 4.8 10.1 16.4 28.6 23.1 37.4 50.1 
No. of Corporate 
 R&D Centers 
0 1b 12 54 183 966 2,270 7,110 11,810 18,775 
Source: Author's compilation from Ministry of Education, Science and Technology and Korea 
Industrial Technology Association (KOITA) 
Note: a = R&D/GNP date up to 1995, b = 1976 data 
 
Direct R&D: Infrastructure 
Countries like Korea that had no culture in R&D had to create an R&D environment 
and they started with infrastructure investment. In case of Korea, in order to support the 
industry’s technological learning, KIST had been established in 1966. As Korea’s first 
multidisciplinary and integrated research and technology center, KIST covered broad 
activities in applied research in the early stage of development in Korea. As market needs for 
technology have been sophisticated and complicated, several GRIs have been rapidly 
emerged from the KIST as a form of spin-off. Each GRI specialized in a specific research 
topic upon market prioritizing industries. Commercialization of semiconductor and 
telecommunication technology could be realized under the intensive collaboration between 
those spin-off GRIs and private endeavor. 
Together with foundation of KIST, the Korean government created two major science 
parks: Seoul research valley and Daedeok Science Park. Seoul research valley was created in 
1966 with three R&D institutes including KIST and three economic research institutes 
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including Korea Development Institute (KDI). However, the research valley was weakening 
in attracting private R&D centers.  
Another science park, Daedeok Science Park, was created in Daejeon city, located 
approximately 200km away from Seoul, in 1974. It aims to create eco-system of 
technological progress through close interaction among GRIs, private sector, and universities. 
The Daedeok Science Park succeeded in attracting not only GRIs but also private R&D labs 
and universities. Its reputation is however not as strong as Tsukuba in Japan as a world-class 
science park nor Hsinchu in Taiwan as a world-class hi-tech SMEs’ town. 
The government has also created research-oriented graduate school in science and 
technology in 1971. The Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) was 
an aim to rear S&T gifted students who would play an important role for national 
technological progress. In order to attract young and talented students, government provided 
unprecedented incentives to students such as scholarship with full tuition exemption and 
living allowance including housing and the most attractive carrot was the exemption of 
military obligation. 
 
Direct R&D: R&D Promotion Program 
 The Korean government has started massive R&D programs in order to upgrade 
national R&D capability and capacity. On the basis of specialty, government required 
university to conduct basic research activities and ordered GRIs and private firms to 
concentrate applied and commercialized research efforts. 
With enactment of the Basic Research Promotion Law in 1989, government invested 
targeting basic research topics regarding to the national R&D priorities. Just like the United 
States, government introduced a separated plan of promoting science research centers (SRCs) 
and engineering research centers (ERCs) in the universities. By 1993, fourteen SRCs and 
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sixteen ERCs had been established and they received almost 20 billion Korean won ($24.2 
million) from the government in 1993 (Kim, 1997). The limited research capacity and 
capability of universities are still a bottleneck in national development as well as training 
university researchers. 
In order to fill this missing capability, GRIs have played a role of the backbone in 
Korea R&D. National R&D Project (NRDP) in 1982, Industrial Generic Technology 
Development Project (IGTDP) in 1989, and Highly Advanced National (HAN) R&D Project 
(or G7 Project) in 1991 had been announced and implemented by Korean government and 
most of the research grants awarded to GRIs in conjunction with private anchors.  
IGTDP focused on facing problems. Even in late 1980s, Korea firms relied heavily 
on Japanese technologies. Substitution of Japanese parts in the electronics and machinery 
industries was a prime job for the IGTDP program. Government supported 11.5 billion 
Korean won in 1989 and 88.7 billion Korean won in 1993 but the amounts was not enough to 
solve facing critical problems. 
The concentration of NRDP projects was different from IGTDP program. The NRDP 
projects focused on future problems that Korea would face in near or long-term future. Since 
investment to the future technology has a high risk of failure, it would be necessary to have 
government involvement. With government sophisticated analysis, target areas such as new 
materials development, energy conservation technology and nuclear energy fuel localization 
were chosen. The government spent 112.1 billion Korean won from 1982 to 1983. 
The most ambitious government vision was HAN Project (or G7 project)20. The 
HAN project contained both product technology development projects which are close to 
applied technology development such as high-definition television (HDTV) and next-
                                           
20 HAN project was also known as G7 project due to government goal was to lift up Korea’s technological 
capability to the level of G7 member countries by 2020. 
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generation vehicle, and fundamental technology development projects that are basic research 
and technology such as renewable energy, new functional biomaterials and environmental 
technology. Total amount of the project was 5.7 billion US dollars and about half of the 
money came from government and universities and remaining half budget contributed by 
private firms.  
 
Indirect R&D 
Alike the above mentioned, R&D oriented policy was rarely existed in the 1960s and 
1970s. Government supported preferential R&D loans but the interest rates were higher than 
other government programs due to lower priorities within government. In addition to that, 
private firms had fewer interests in R&D promotion activities because of requirement of low-
tech technology in their business. However, the situation turned around in 1980s. Preferential 
R&D loans became a key incentive to conduct intensive R&D activities in the firms. 
According to Kim (1997)’s calculation, preferential financing reached to 671.6 billion Korean 
won in 1987 and it meant about 94 percent of total corporate R&D financing was funded by 
the government. 
Tax incentives were another form of indirect R&D support. In order to promote 
corporate R&D investment, tariff reduction on imported R&D equipment and supplies, 
deduction of annual noncapital R&D expenditures from tax income, real estate related to 
R&D purpose tax exemption were introduced as tax incentives. Also, Korean government 
created the Technology Development Reserve Fund that a corporate can reserve 3 percent (4 
percent in hi-tech industries) of sales and it would be permitted to use the reserve to its R&D 
activities for next 3 years. Other types of incentives such as specific industry support program, 
technology-based SMEs promotion program and various cost reduction on R&D related 
activities were provided by the government. Government also gave certification to the firms 
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that commercialized new technologies, called Korea Technology (KT) or New Technology 
(NT) award under the New Technology Commercialization Program implemented in 1993. 
The last, government encouraged private firms to spin off its small labs into separate young 
companies and institutes as a part of spin-off support program in 1992. 
 
Overview of Korea’s Incentive Schemes for Industrial Technology Development 
  
 Korea has designed and implemented a variety of incentive policies to promote 
technological capability in target industries (Table 4-5). From the early 1960s, corporate tax 
deduction and exemption programs for FDI firms that satisfied technology requisite were 
introduced. After the incentives, government also implemented diverse incentive systems in 
1970s. However, those incentives in 1960s and 1970s were targeted to technology transfer 
activities rather than that of R&D. It was because that domestic capability and capacity for 
R&D efforts were not built yet. Only 1980s and late years, government expended its 
incentives for indigenous R&D activities. National R&D program initiated from 1982 was a 
flare that government’s focus has been reshaped from imported technology transfer oriented 
to internal R&D activity oriented. 
 Also, the change of government incentive system from vertical approach to 
horizontal approach or functional support was formalized by the enactment of the Industrial 
Development Law in 1990 because of rapid expansion of private R&D activities on the basis 
of economic of scale and technological complexity.
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Table 4-5  Chronology of Major Technology Policies 
 
Source: Sub et al. (2007) 
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4.3. Market Response: Enhancing Absorptive Capacity and Intensity of Efforts 
 
As we mentioned in chapter 2, the foregoing government intervention and incentive, 
such as policies to promote both demand for innovation and supply of capabilities in case of 
Korea, cannot explain the different growth rates among catching-up countries and among 
firms within a nation. This is because one-way government provision cannot contribute to the 
national growth and it means intimated linkage not only between demand and supply policies 
but also between government and market are a key for attaining higher economic growth. 
Therefore, market and technological environment promoted by government incentive or 
manipulated by government intervention are crucial and it affects to a significant extent not 
only the behavior of market, especially firms as basic economic agent units including all 
actors such as suppliers and customers, but also interactions among them (Figure 3-4).  
Once the government incentive gains the summit, it compels the firm to intensify its 
efforts to strengthen internal activities for enhancing technological capability. It also compels 
the firm to intensify its efforts internally and externally to strengthen technological capability 
and to deepen its knowledge from outside sources and its interplay with other stakeholders 
(players) in advance.  
In this section, the study introduces firms’ continuous innovation for serving 
qualified goods and services with low cost in order to meet the needs of customers. The 
innovation efforts are the following items: first, firms’ devotion for acquiring knowledge and 
intensity of efforts; second, activities of technology transfer and diffusion; third, in-house 
R&D efforts for enhancing technological capability; fourth, human capital empowerment; 
and fifth, crisis management and upgrading organizational structure within firm based on 
Korean case. 
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4.3.1. Initial Stage: Acquiring Knowledge and Intensifying Efforts 
 
The level of knowledge and intensity of effort are key determinant factors for 
technological progress regardless of the level of technology. On the basis of current 
knowledge gains, firms can upgrade their technological advance. Without continuous 
intensifying efforts, technological progress is difficult or slower. In this section, we would 
like to emphasize the importance of acquiring knowledge and intensity of efforts in the initial 
stage in order to build up eco-system.  
Kim (1997, 1999) created an absorptive capacity framework through the following 
two key ingredients: knowledge base and intensity of effort. Current knowledge is a 
fundamental asset to tomorrow’s knowledge because current knowledge affects knowledge 
learning process and it creates better and advanced future knowledge. The intensity of effort 
is an engine to solve facing problems. Without the effort, the existing knowledge cannot 
contribute to enhance absorptive capacity of a firm. According to the Figure 4-2, 
technological capability is high and rising rapidly when both existing knowledge base and 
intensity of effort are high (quadrant 1). On the other hand, technological capability is low 
and falling rapidly when both intensity of effort and existing knowledge base are low 
(quadrant 4). In case of quadrant 2, firms with high existing knowledge but with low intensity 
of effort may have a possibility to lose its gained knowledge gradually (move down to 
quadrant 4) because technology is rapidly improved. In contrast, firms with low existing 
knowledge but with high intensity of effort (see quadrant 3) may have low technological 
capability now but will rise it rapidly in future due to their energy based on intensity of effort 
lead them to move up to quadrant 1 through continuous technological learning activities. In 
short, he argued that the intensity of effort is more crucial than existing knowledge base for 
long-term prospect.  
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Figure 4-2  Absorptive Capacity Framework 
 
Source: Kim (1997, 1999) 
 
In 1960s, Korea had neither capital nor technology in order to be industrialized 
countries. Also, there was no domestic market to do business activities. Therefore, the Korean 
government had to opt for an export and outward-oriented strategies with its only strengthen -
- relatively well-trained human capital with strong will to overcome current poverty. The 
government set up two main goals in this respect: transfer of foreign technologies and 
developing domestic absorptive capacity of the transferred technology. Reverse engineering, 
original equipment manufacturing (OEM) and foreign licensing have been critical role to 
transfer foreign technologies but foreign direct investment (FDI) was not a main aim for 
technological learning21.  
Under the government regime, private firms propelled appropriate strategies 
according to industries. Firms in light industries such as garment, wig, and shoes received 
benefit from OEM business and training program of turnkey plants package. Especially, 
                                           
21 The reason is mentioned in the followed section: “3.2.1.2. Supply of Technology: Technology Policy and 
Incentives.” 
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OEM provided them to understand the whole business cycle from planning and design to 
quality control and marketing. For the HCI industries, firms depended on turnkey plants with 
operational training program and foreign licensing as a tool of acquiring foreign technologies. 
Because of the Korean government policy on business agent promotion, big corporations 
(would become chaebols afterward) utilized various benefits fully from financing support to 
domestic market monopoly ownership22. Also, technologically weakened industries were 
compensated by GRIs’ technological supports. Those technological learning through informal 
channels enabled Korea to acquire technologies at lower costs and to maintain domestic firms’ 
independence from MNCs. However, Korea experienced difficulties in acquiring 
sophisticated technologies that could be imported by FDI channels and the speed of 
technological progress was relatively slower than other countries like Taiwan at the early 
stage of development (Lall, 2003). 
 
 
4.3.2. Period of Technology Catch-up: Technology Transfer and Diffusion 
 
As this study depicts in figure 3-4, three main sources interplay in the process of 
technological progress: international community, domestic community, in-house efforts at the 
firm level. First, international source is a very important source of technological learning in 
catching-up countries. Learning new technologies, using expertise (or experts), and 
upgrading absorptive capability of technology are the benefits gained from the international 
community. Therefore, intimate relation with the international community is necessity to 
upgrade firms’ technological ability. Domestic source is another way of enhancing 
                                           
22 Korean government compensated chaebols’ effort on massive investment of HCI industries based on export 
first strategy as domestic import substitution business that could easily collect money and other capitals. 
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technological capability at firms. Joint research project among domestic players from public, 
private and university is the most predominant way of collaborating domestically. The last is 
firm’s self-effort. It is a stepping-stone of upgrading technological capabilities. Interaction of 
diverse ingredients within firms such as existing technological capability, production 
experience and trial and error, and R&D activities are main factors for technological progress. 
 As we mentioned above, international community is the most important source for 
technology transfer in the early stage of development. Even though many literature on 
technology transfer points out the important role of FDI, other literature with empirical 
supports emphasizes that informal channel of technology transfer and diffusion is much 
greater than that of formal channel during early stage of development in catching-up 
countries (Kim, 1990 and 1997). According to Kim’s finding, he described the activities of 
technology transfer in two dimensions: market-mediation and attitude of foreign suppliers 
(Figure 4-3). In case of market-mediation, it relates to whether formal agreement and 
payment needs between foreign suppliers and local buyers. Also, attitude of foreign suppliers 
means whether the suppliers may participate technology transfer activities actively or 
passively. FDI, FLs and turnkey package can be quadrant 1 (market-mediated and active role 
of foreign suppliers) and capital goods can be classified in quadrant 2 (market-mediated and 
passive role of foreign suppliers). Literature review, journals, observation and reverse 
engineering are classified in quadrant 4 (non market-mediated and passive role of foreign 
suppliers) and quadrant 3 is included such as technical assistance. In case of Korea, it 
preferred to non active participation of foreigners such as quadrant 2 and 4 instead of 
quadrant 1 and 3. It is because that Korean had an allergy to direct involvement of foreign 
firms, as we pointed out already.  
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Figure 4-3  Evolution of Technology Transfer in Catching-up 
 
Source: Kim (1990, 1997) 
 
 Increasing royalty ceiling for technology transfer from foreigners, GRIs foundation 
for facilitating the acquiring technology transfer, deregulation of prior approval of technology 
transfer contract, technology development promotion law in 1972 and diverse technology 
localization promotion plans during 1970s, and tax exemption for imported capital goods 
were incentives to create an active business environment for domestic firms. 
 
 
4.3.3. In-House R&D Efforts for Enhancing Technological Capability 
 
 As Korea can take advantage of neither light-and-labor-intensive industries nor one-
way technology transfer from foreigners, Korea had to reshape its strategy for hi-tech 
industries with enhancing empowerment of domestic players. Simultaneously, increasing 
viewpoint that technologically advanced countries started to regard Korea as a future 
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competitor in the global market hindered Korea to acquire foreign technology transfer, even 
though Korea had to do a lot for achieving industrialization. As a result, Korea had to do with 
building up indigenous R&D capability. 
 However, given context of Korea in terms of R&D, there was only a very limited 
experience within and without domestic firms. No experience at the universities was almost 
same as that of private sector. Therefore, government designated GRIs as a R&D supporter. 
According to Lee’s finding (2010), the late-industrializing countries in Asia including Korea 
have shown a tendency to rely on formal collaboration channels such as joint or contract-
based research because those catch-up countries do not usually have enough technological 
capability to take a lead for a collaboration project without government support and drive. 
KIST and its spin-off GRIs that specialized each target industries and technologies led R&D 
activities and they spend a large proportion of the total national R&D budgets until early 
1980s. In order to upgrade firms’ technological capability in a short period of time, 
government organized joint research team and joint consortium among chaebols, GRIs in 
charge and even university later on.  
Even though several attempts were failed to transfer the results, as time goes by 
private firms could improve their capability to indentify prospective technologies and foreign 
suppliers and accumulated experiences and know-how from those joint activities helped firms 
to assimilate and adapt imported technologies rapidly. Joint collaboration between private 
firms and GRIs reached diverse success cases from polyester film to semiconductor and 
telecommunication after all. Also, Kim (1990, 1997) pointed out those joint collaboration was 
helpful for generating experienced researchers and they would play a pivotal role in private 
R&D centers later on. 
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Box 2. Korea’s ICT Industry Development 
 
In case of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) industry for example 
in Korea, Korea government started to recognize the urgency of localization of ICT 
technology as a country’s next growth engine next to HCIs from late 1970s. The 
government formulated a consortium under the scheme of public-private-partnership. 
Electronic and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI), Korean 
Telecommunications Authority (KTA23), and four chaebols (Samsung, LG, Daewoo, 
and Hanwha) joined the consortium. Enormous government incentives such as import 
restriction of foreign ICT equipment and technology, provision of domestic market 
share to above four chaebols, and sequencing massive financial support were 
provided to the ICT industry promote programs. From the first success of developing 
a proprietary digital switching system, called TDX (Time-Division eXchange), the 
consortium had developed various switching systems and its indigenous capability 
could advance to wireless and mobile telecommunication. In 1992, the government 
designated Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) as the national standard for 
mobile communications24 even though national competence remained in the analog 
communication technology at that time. With cooperative efforts between public and 
private endeavors for years, the first commercial CDMA service was launched by 
Korea and spread to the rest of the world. In addition, the success of CDMA could 
lead to strengthen mobile phone industry of Korea. In 2010, CDMA service was used 
by 577 million people in 95 countries (Statistics of CDMA Development Group) and 
                                           
23 KTA became an independent public corporation with the name of Korea Telecom (KT) in 1990. 
24 The reason for choosing CDMA as a national standard was to preoccupy the global ICT market because GSM 
(a rival standard against CDMA) was chosen as an European standard at the same. 
75 
 
two Korean chaebols’ (Samsung and LG) global market share reached to 29.4 
percent according to International Data Corporation (IDC). Most importantly, private 
firms were the main actors for the process of the development of ICT industry. 
Without their intense efforts on acquirement, assimilation, adoption, development, 
and commercialization, the government incentives could not have led to the great 
success. 
 
Beginning of launching National R&D Project (NRDP) in 1982, Korea government 
took various policy instruments to promote and facilitate private R&D activities. Private 
sector’s response was to make massive R&D investment. In consequence, technology imports 
had been declined sharply, whereas private R&D expenditure had been increased rapidly 
contrastively (Figure 4-4). 
 
Figure 4-4  Changing Relationship between Royalty Payments and Business 
Expenditures on R&D, 1976-2005 
 
Source: Suh et al. (2007) 
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Also, main anchors of R&D activities turned from public GRIs to private firms 
(Figure 4-1). From 1982, R&D expenditure ratio between public and private sector turned 
around and nowadays, government R&D budget is 10,889 billion Korean won and it is about 
28 percent of total national R&D expenditure in 200925. 
Since Korea has been grown up, the Korean government cannot take care of all 
targeted industries because of increasing economic of scales and technological complexity. 
After all, government quitted intervening to industries directly, instead it involved indirectly 
such as industrial infrastructure designing and long-term plan implementing. As a facilitator 
and promoter, the government however is intervening to the market and industries 
continuously. At the same time, the government initiated R&D programs in basic and 
fundamental scientific research and technology in order to maintain its technological 
potential in the future. 
 
 
4.3.4. Human Capital Empowerment 
 
In fact, education is also one of key determinants for economic growth together with 
technological progress as many literatures mentioned. However, the importance of education 
is excluded in this study that focused on the relation between government incentive and 
technological learning and the importance of technological progress for national growth. 
Nevertheless, this part would like to convey the role of education as a key factor for 
enhancing technological capability at the firm level due to necessity of educated and skilled 
human capital for technological progress. 
                                           
25 Private R&D expenditure is 26,961 billion Korean won and it is about 71 percent of total national R&D 
expenditure in 2009 (Ministry of Education, Science and Technology). 
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Initially, the Korean government was a main actor for providing and expanding the 
education system based on the market needs successfully. Strong demand for education based 
on Confucianism and homogeneity of Korean society26 also contributed to planning and 
implementing the education policy. The government established a compulsory primary 
education in 1954. After achieving the universal primary education, the government shifted 
its focus to secondary education in the 1960s and 1970s and then to higher education in the 
1980s to satisfy the market needs in HCIs. 
There are two main contributions to supply and to train well-educated and skilled 
works continuously: provision of on-site and after-work vocational school and specialized 
vocational training school. 
First, the on-site and after-work vocational school was established by chaebols from 
1977 and small and medium size firms gradually sent their young employees to evening 
classes nearby the firms after Korean government enacted in-plant training compulsory law 
for all companies that retained more than 300 employees and vocational training promotion 
fund, which was financed by fines imposed to the firms that did not fulfill government 
requirements on employees’ training in 1976 respectively (Gill at al, 2000). This free on-site 
school benefited both employers and employees. Low turnover rate, higher productivity and 
loyalty were one of benefited from the program and especially the passion for higher 
education led them to gear to work hard with higher loyalty. The number of such schools 
increased from 5 in 1977 to 42 in 1980 and those schools became to provide high-school 
program to the workers who completed the middle school program. By the early 1980s, more 
than 70,000 young workers completed their secondary education while on the job (Kim, 
1997). 
                                           
26 It was ironic that Japanese colonial period, land reform after the independence from the Japanese 
colonization, and Korean War contributed to cultivate such an equitable social structure and mindset. 
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Another contribution was to provide specialized vocational training school. With 
enactment of the Vocational Training Law in 1967, vocational high schools were established27 
by Korean government right away to provide skilled workers to the growing light industries. 
Junior colleagues and polytechnic or vocational colleagues were also designed to supply 
technicians to the fast growing HCI industries. Establishment of Kum-Oh National Technical 
High School in 1972 for example was appropriate provision of skilled manpower to the 
strategic industries. Kum-Oh high school provided state-of-the-art equipments that did not 
exist in Korea for practical training and employed Japanese teachers who had technical 
know-how and experience in a practical way. Also, various incentives to the students of the 
Kum-Oh high school were provided such as full tuition fee exemption and living allowance 
including housing. Especially, students who successfully graduated the Kum-Oh had a 
privilege to work at the most prestige chaebols with a higher salary and a chance to work 
overseas. Those incentives attracted many young talented students from poor families in 
particular to enroll the school. By 1990, the number of graduate at Kum-Oh high school was 
6,164 and the high school won 18 medals (gold medals were 14) at the Vocational Olympics 
in the same period28. The success of Kum-Oh high school led to establish enormous 
specialized technical high school in Korea. Consequently Korea won 9 times in a row from 
1977 to 1991 at the Vocational Olympics29. 
Also, the government created KAIST in 1971 as a same purpose as that of Kum-Oh 
National Technical High School. KAIST as an aim to nurture S&T gifted students who will 
devote to upgrade R&D capability. The incentives scheme of KAIST was also almost same as 
                                           
27 The Korean government categorized 4 types of specialized technical high school as such: machinery school 
(precision processing engineers), model schools (oversees dispatched engineers), specialized schools (engineers 
for specialized industry), and general school (engineers for general industry). Number of schools was 19, 11, 10, 
and 55 respectively (Kang, 2011). 
28 Author's compilation from the website of Kumoh Technical High School retrieved from 
http://www.koths.or.kr/ (In Korean). 
29 Introduction of technical licensing and certification system in 1973 to verify competitive students also 
contributed to the success in the Vocational Olympics. 
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that of Kum-Oh high school. In order to attract young and talented students, government 
provided unprecedented incentives to students such as scholarship with full tuition fee 
exemption and leaving allowance including housing and the exemption of military obligation. 
 
 
4.3.5. Crisis Management and Upgrading Organizational Structure within Firms 
 
In catching-up period, a country plays an orchestral role for industrialization like 
Asian NIEs often formulates a series of crises by imposing challenging missions in 
prioritized industries. The picking winner approach is clearly shown to the firms that winner 
takes all and loser has to get out of the business. When a crisis happens, regular technological 
learning activities have to be quitted and firms get into trouble. Given crisis, firms have to 
find out a way of continuing activities for technological learning and progress in order to 
maintain their market competitiveness. In such a case, the only firm that invests not only 
human capital but also capital goods intensively in order to acquire new tacit and explicit 
knowledge as well as knowledge exchange can survive and take a lead in the global market. 
If a firm succeeds in sustaining the technological learning, the firm becomes a new (or a 
continuous) market leader after the crisis has been gone. In case of Korea, the government 
created a sequencing challenge to the market and the series of crises motivated Korean firms 
to become the world leading competitors at the end. 
Crisis may also be happened regularly by nature. In 1980s, new crisis that created 
naturally faced to the firms. The global economy recession, protectionism, harsh competition 
among catching-up countries in the field of light and labor intensive industries, and import 
liberalization required firms to restructure its organization fitting into new business eco-
system.  
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Chaebol that usually gets used to traditional chief in commander military style of 
organization had to transform itself into new innovative and technology oriented organization. 
This military type of organization requires a decentralized, self-reliance, small but 
strategically systematic business unit structure. Creative individuals with efficient small 
groups and effective and flexible coordination across the whole process of production enables 
to applicable. Also, the structure can be easily communicated, indentify and respond quickly 
to market opportunities, threats and technological possibilities. This transformation is one of 
the most formidable tasks facing Korean chaebols, even up to now. Therefore, the strategic 
importance of top and middle management should not be overlooked in order to attain the 
restructuring. Their role is vital in continuous and discontinuous coordination and 
communication between working level employees and executive level officials. In Korea, 
retraining those middle level managements is a prior job for chaebols. 
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5. Conclusion and Implications 
 
This study explores the Korean way of development in the early stage of 
industrialization from the perspective of analyzing the relationship between technological 
learning and government incentives. As many scholars pointed out, government in late 
industrializing countries, especially countries succeeded in transforming from poorer 
countries to richer and advanced countries like Japan and four Asian Tigers, played a 
significant role as an environment creator and a facilitator.  
변경: As many scholars pointed out, the government played a significant role as an 
environment creator and a facilitator, especially in countries like Japan and four Asian Tigers, 
which were both late-comers in terms of industrialization and succeeded in transforming from 
being poor to rich and advanced.  
In case of Korea, the government set a national agenda with growth targets and 
industries and provided a package of policy instrument. Overcoming agro-based economic 
structure and lack of domestic market and capability, the government created a demand of 
technology through industrial policies and incentives. Under the umbrella of outward-looking 
and export-oriented national strategy, government drove to promote big business agents 
(chaebols) and to select strategic industries that enabled to sustain economic development of 
Korea in future. Through the government activities, technological capability can be improved 
in conjunction with industrial endowment. The government poured out massive incentive 
programs under the names of tax exemption, preferential loan, and domestic market 
monopoly to only performing firms selectively and continuously. At the same time, the 
government fully supplied technological provision to firms through science and technology 
policy. The government established numerous GRIs and spin-offs to support the activities of 
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technology transfer and diffusion that market would like to have. Also, for enhancing 
indigenous R&D ability, the government provides massive R&D funding and infrastructure 
program such as National R&D program and HAN project. 
However, those foregoing government interventions cannot solely boost the level of 
national technology. Instead, those government’s efforts become a powerful mechanism only 
together with market’s appropriate response. Firms’ intensifying efforts of acquiring, 
assimilating, and imitating foreign technology based on talented and passionate individuals 
should be corresponding with the government initiation. In the initial stage of development, 
firms devoted to learn and assimilate foreign technologies through reverse engineering, OEM 
products and turnkey plants. Also, with interactive activities with GRIs and other firms for 
technology transfer and diffusion, firms could enhance their capability and it contributed 
them to start in-house R&D efforts. The Last, firms could become stronger with crisis 
management. Either generating crisis by government or firm itself or natural crisis caused by 
global recession, firms had to maintain and upkeep their technological capability to survive 
from the given crisis. Nowadays, they are trying to restructure their organization to be more 
timely appropriate to the new innovative and technological global society. 
 
In summary, the Korean experience provides three implications for catching-up 
countries. First, government and market in developing countries especially with limited 
natural resource nations should carefully target industries and activities and all their efforts 
with incentive structure should focus on fostering in applied technology rather than basic and 
pure scientific research if they would like to accomplish rapid industrialization. As we 
mentioned, developing countries usually suffer from limited resources, finance in particular. 
Therefore, they have to focus on the role of selectivity to maximize effectiveness of limited 
resources in activities. There is no doubt that basic science would be a crucial backbone for 
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long-term advancement and for knowledge and innovation economy. However, what Korea 
case emphasized is that the timing of fund allocation between applied technology and basic 
technology should be differentiated. The role of KIST, Korea’s first multi-discipline research 
institute in science and technology, as a foreign technology transferor and diffusioner instead 
of basic scientific research aim can provide significant implications to developing countries. 
Also, the dominance of private R&D institutes in the national R&D share indicates that 
Korean R&D system is focused overly on industrial technology. 
Second, interactive linkage between government and market is very important. As 
many scholars found out, one-way of government incentive cannot contribute to the national 
growth and technological learning and progress. As old saying goes, it takes two to tango. 
Systematic and close coordination between government incentive and market’s intensifying 
efforts (or response) can play a tango. A consortium building as public-private-partnership is 
a good example. In case of ICT industry, Korean government supported to organize a 
consortium for telecommunication equipment and service. GRIs like ETRI and private firms 
such as Samsung and LG (chaebols) participated in the consortium. With government 
massive incentives in both direct and indirect way, the consortium could develop TDX and its 
success continued to launch the first commercial CDMA service in the world after all. Also, 
technological capability gained from those experiences and the benefit of global dominating 
CDMA service provider has led Korea’s handset industry as a top manufacturer in the world 
nowadays. 
Last but not least, government incentives with high pressure to stimulate market 
should be implemented in the early stage of development. Even though government does not 
intend to create crisis in the market, global recession happens regularly. Without any 
preparation to the crisis, domestic market and nation itself will easily collapse and lose its 
competitiveness. Therefore, government should create a system of incubation: that is to push 
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into emergency situation and to provide incentives to the firms regularly. In case of Korea, 
monthly export promotion meeting that was held 177 times for two decades on a regular basis 
provided a platform to inject massive pressure as well as to provide sequencing incentive 
toward firms. With President’s leadership, the meeting was a venue to remind (or assign) 
export target and to identify and solve facing problems of export related issues immediately. 
Also, the meeting is a place for a beauty contest not only among business anchors to dig out 
more government support but also government officials to be promoted and be awarded by 
the president. 
 
In fact, there is no single practice to be replicated for technological development and 
economic growth. A number of different options are available but recipient countries should 
carefully implement those options upon the countries’ socio-economic and political situation 
as well as global environment. Of course, there are common elements to develop technology 
as such: government leadership, appropriate strategy and commitment, well-trained 
manpower, effective technology supporting systems, attractive incentive mechanism, and 
intensifying efforts of business anchors. Therefore, we must note that the priority should be 
on adequate analysis of global and domestic context followed by cautious designing and 
implementation of national programs.. Its underlying philosophy is driven more by faith than 
rationality and evidence as Lall mentioned (2003). 
  
85 
 
 
 
 
Reference 
 
 
 
Abramovitz, Moses (1956). Resource and Output Trends in the United States since 1870. 
Washington DC: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
_____ (1986). “Catching Up, Forging Ahead, and Falling Behind.” The Journal of Economic 
History, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 385-406. 
Abernathy, William (1978). The Productivity Dilemma. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press. 
Allen, Thomas (1977). Managing the Flow of Technology. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT 
Press. 
Ames, Edward and Rosenberg, Nathan (1963). “Changing Technological Leadership and 
Industrial Growth.” The Economic Journal, 73 (289), pp. 13-31. 
Arrow, Kenneth (1962). “The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing.” The Review of 
Economic Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 155-173. 
Balzat, Markus and Hanusch, Horst (2004). “Recent trends in the research on national 
innovation systems.” Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 197-210. 
Bello, Walden and Rosenfeld, Stephanie (1990). Dragons in distress: Asia's miracle 
economies in crisis. San Francisco : Institute for Food and Development Policy. 
CDMA Development Group. CDMA Statistics. Retrieved October 18th, 2011 from 
http://www.cdg.org/worldwide/cdma_world_subscriber.asp  
Chandler, Alfred (1977). The visible hand: The managerial revolution in American business. 
Boston: Harvard University Press. 
Clark, Kim, and Fujimoto, Takahiro (1987). “Overlapping problem solving in product 
development.” Working Paper 87-048, Harvard Business School 
Cohen, Wesley and Levinthal, Daniel (1990). “Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on 
Learning and Innovation.” Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 128-152. 
Cornwall, John (1976). “Diffusion, Convergence and Kaldor's Laws.” The Economic Journal, 
Vol. 86, No. 342, pp. 307-314. 
_____ (1982). Modern capitalism: Its growth and transformation. New York: M.E. Sharpe. 
David, Paul and Foray, Dominique (1995). “Accessing and expanding the science and 
technology knowledge.” STI Science, Technology, Industry Review, Vol. 16, pp. 13-68. 
86 
 
Denison, Edward and Poullier, Jean-Pierre (1967). Why growth rates differ: Postwar 
experience in nine western countries. Washington DC: Brookings Institute. 
Denision, Edward (1985). Trends in American economic growth, 1929-1982. Washington DC: 
Brookings Institute. 
Fagerberg, Jan (1987). “A technology gap approach to why growth rates differ.” Research 
Policy, Vol. 16, pp. 87-99. 
_____ (1994). “Technology and International Differences in Growth Rates.” Journal of 
Economic Literature, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 1147-1175. 
FORTUNE Global 500 (2011). Fortune. 164(2), 151. Retrieved from EBSCOhost. 
Freeman, Christopher (1987). Technology, policy, and economic performance: Lessons from 
Japan. London: Printer Publishers. 
Galli, Riccardo and Teubal, Morris (1997). “Paradigmatic Shifts in National Innovation 
Systems.” In Edquist, Charles (Eds.). Systems of innovation: technologies, institutions, 
and organizations. UK: Routledge 
Gall, Indermit and Ihm, Chon-Sun (2000). “Republic of Korea” In Gall, Indermit at al (Eds.). 
Vocational education and training reform : matching skills to markets and budgets. 
Washington DC: World Bank Publications. 
Gerschenkron, Alexander (1962). Economic backwardness in historical perspective. New 
York, Washington, London: Frederick. 
Gomulka, Stanislaw (1971). Inventive activity, diffusion, and the stages of economic growth. 
Aarhus, Denmark: Aarhus University. 
Goldsmith, Maurice (1970). “Technological Innovation and the Economy.” Science of 
Science Foundation Symposium on Technological Innovation and the Growth of the 
Economy. London : Wiley-Interscience. 
Greenwald, Bruce and Stiglitz, Joseph (1986). “Externalities in Economies with Imperfect 
Information and Incomplete Markets.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101 (2), pp. 
229-264. 
Griliches, Zvi and Mason, William (1972). “Education, Income, and Ability.” Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 80, No. 3, Part 2: Investment in Education: The Equity-
Efficiency Quandary, pp. S74-S103. 
Grossman, Gene and Helpman, Elhanan (1991). Innovation and growth in the global 
economy. Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
Hamberg, Daniel (1963) "Invention in the industrial research laboratory." Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 71, No. 2, pp. 95-115. 
International Data Corporation (IDC). Press Release (2011, Apr 28). Retrieved October 18th, 
2011 from http://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS22808211  
87 
 
Johnston, R., and Gibbons, M. (1975) “Characteristics of information usage in technological 
innovation.” IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, Vol. EM-22, pp. 27-34. 
Kaldor, Nicholas and Mirrlees, James (1962). “A New Model of Economic Growth.” The 
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 174-192 
Kang, Kyung-Jong (2011). “Establishment of Technical High Schools and Junior Colleges.” 
2010 Modularization of Korea’s Development Experience: R&D and Technical 
Education, Ch. 03. Seoul: Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Republic of Korea 
KITA (Korea Industrial Technology Association). Trade Statistics. Retrieved September 5th, 
2011 from http://www.kita.org/ 
Kim, Linsu (1990). “Technological Challange in the Asia-Pacific Economy.” In Soesastro, 
Hadi and Pangestu, Mari (Eds.). Korea: The Acquisition of Technology. Sydney: Allen 
and Unwin.  
_____ (1997). Imitation to Innovation: The Dynamics of Korea’s Technological Learning. 
Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press.  
_____ (1999). “Building technological capability for industrialization: analytical frameworks 
and Korea's experience.” Industrial and Corporate Change (Oxford Journals), Vol. 8, 
Issue 1, pp. 111-136 
KOITA (Korea Industrial Technology Association). R&D Indicator. Retrieved September 
25th, 2011 from http://www.koita.or.kr/eng/indicators/koita_industrial.asp 
KOSIS (Korea Statistical Information Service). Statistical Database. Retrieved September 5th, 
2011 from http://www.kosis.kr/eng/ 
Kim, Young-Sub et al. (2010). Father of Science and Technolog: President Park’s 
Leadership. Seoul: MSD Media. (In Korean: 과학대통령 박정회와 리더십) 
Krugman, Paul (1994). “The Myth of Asia’s Miracle.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 6, pp. 
62-78 
Lall, Sanjaya (1992). “Technological Capabilities and Industrialization.” World Development, 
Vol. 20, Issue 2, pp. 165-186  
_____ (2001). Competitiveness, Technology and Skills. UK: Edward Elgar. 
_____ and Urata, Shujiro (2003). Competitiveness, FDI and Technological Activity in East 
Asia. UK: Edward Elgar. 
Lee, Keun at al. (1997). Technological Capabilities and Competitiveness of Korea’s 
Industries. Seoul: Kyungmoonsa (In Korean: 한국산업의 기술능력과 경쟁력). 
Lee, Keun and Kang, Raeyoon (2010). “University-Industry Linkages and Economic Catch-
Up in Asia.” International Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 1, Vol. 2, pp. 151-169. 
88 
 
Lee, Keun and Kim, Byung-Yeon (2008). “Both Institutions and Policies Matter but 
Differently for Different Income Groups of Countries: Determinants of Long-Run 
Economic Growth Revisited.” World Development, Vol. 37, issue 3, pp. 533-549. 
Lee, Suk-Chae (1991). “The Heavy and Chemical Industries Promotion Plan (1973–1979).” 
In Cho, Lee-Jay and Kim, Yoon Hyung (EDs.). Economic Development in the Republic 
of Korea: A Policy Perspective. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 
Lundvall, B-Å. (Eds.) (1992). National Systems of Innovation: Towards a Theory of 
Innovation and Interactive Learning. London: Pinter Publishers. 
Mansfield, Dewin (1984). R&D and innovation: some empirical findings, In Zvi Griliches 
(Eds.). R&D, Patents, and Productivity. Washington DC: National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
March, James and Simon, Herbert (1958). Organizations. New York: Wiley. 
Metcalfe, S. (1995). “The Economic Foundations of Technology Policy: Equilibrium and 
Evolutionary Perspectives.” In P. Stoneman (Eds.). Handbook of the Economics of 
Innovation and Technological Change. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
MEST (Ministry of Education, Science and Technology) (2010a). Survey of Research and 
Development in Korea. Kwachon, Republic of Korea: MEST. 
_____ (2010b). Science and Technology Statistic White book. Kwachon, Republic of Korea: 
MEST. (In Korean) 
MOST (Ministry of Science and Technology) (2008). Forty Year History of Science and 
Technology. Kwachon, Republic of Korea: MOST. (In Korean) 
Mowery, David (1983). “The relationship between intrafirm and contractual forms of 
industrial research in American manufacturing, 1900-1940.” Explorations in Economic 
History, Vol. 20, Issue 4, pp. 351-374. 
Myers, Sumner and Marquis, Donald (1969). Successful industrial innovations Successful 
industrial innovations. Washington DC: National Science Foundation 
Nelson, Richard and Winter, Sidney (1982). An evolutionary theory of economic change. 
Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press. 
Nelson, Richard (1993). National innovation systems: a comparative analysis. Cambridge: 
Oxford University Press. 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) (1996). Reviews of 
National Science and Technology Policy: Republic of Korea. Paris: OECD. 
_____ (1997). National Innovation System. Paris: OECD. 
_____ OECD Statistics. Retrieved September 5th, 2011 from  
http://www.oecd.org/document/0,3746,en_2649_201185_46462759_1_1_1_1,00.html 
89 
 
Ōkawa, Kazushi and Rosovsky, Henry (1973). Japanese economic growth: trend 
acceleration in the twentieth century. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press. 
Patel, Parimal and Pavitt, Keith (1994). “The nature and economic importance of national 
innovation systems.” STI Review, Vol. 3, No. 14, pp. 9-32. Paris: OECD 
Porter, Michael (2001, December). Innovation and Competitiveness: Findings on the 
Netherlands. presented at the Organizing Innovation in the Knowledge-Based Economy, 
The Hague, The Netherlands 
Posner, M.V. (1961). “International Trade and Technical Change.” Oxford Economic Papers 
(New Series), Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 323-341. 
Romer, Paul (1988). “Capital Accumulation In The Theory Of Long Run Growth.” Center 
for Economic Research (RCER) Working Papers 123. New York: University of Rochester. 
_____ (1990). “What Determines the Rate of Growth and Technological Change?” Policy, 
Planning, and Research (PPR) Working Paper Series. Washington: World Bank 
_____ (1991). “Endogenous Technological Change.” National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) Working Paper No. 3210. Cambridge: NBER 
Rosenberg, Nathan (1976). Perspectives on Technology. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
_____ (1982). Inside the Black Box: Technology and Economics. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
_____ (1994). Exploring the black box: technology, economics, and history. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Solow, Robert (1956). “A contribution to the theory of economic growth.” The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 70 (1), pp. 65-94. 
_____ (1957). “Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function.” The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 312-320 
Stiglitz, Joseph (1996). “Some Lessons from the East Asian Miracle.” World Bank Research 
Observer Series, 11 (2), pp. 151-177. 
Suh, Joonhae and Chen, Derek (Eds.) (2007). KOREA as a Knowledge Economy: 
Evolutionary Process and Lessons Learned. Washington DC: World Bank. 
Summers, Robert and Heston, Alan (1978). “Real GDP Per Capita for More Than One 
Hundred Countries.” The Economic Journal, Vol. 88, No. 350, pp. 215-242. 
Teubal, Morris and Justman, Moshe (1995). “Technological infrastructure policy (TIP): 
Creating capabilities and building markets.” Research Policy, Vol. 24, Issue 2, pp. 259-
281. 
90 
 
Tilton, John (1971). International Diffusion of Technology: The Case of Semiconductors. 
Washington DC: Brookings Institution. 
Utterback, James (1994). Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation: How Companies Can Seize 
Opportunities in the Face of Technological Change. Boston: Harvard Business School 
Press. 
Vogel, Ezra (1991). The four Little Dragons: The Spread of Industrialization in East Asia. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
von Hippel, Eric (1988) The Sources of Innovation. New York: Oxford University Press. 
World Bank (1993). The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (World 
Bank Policy Research Reports), Washington DC: World Bank Publications. 
_____. World Bank Database. Retrieved September 5th, 2011 from http://data.worldbank.org/  
Wright, Gavin and Nelson, Richard (1992). “The Rise and Fall of American Technological 
Leadership: The Postwar Era in Historical Perspective.” Journal of Economic Literature, 
Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 1931-1964. 
